The Bay State Monthly. Volume 2, No. 6, March, 1885

Fitchburg

By Mrs. Caroline A. Mason.²

 
Nested among her hills she lies,—
The city of our love!
Within her, pleasant homes arise;
And healthful airs and happy skies
Float peacefully above.
 
 
A sturdy few, 'mid hopes and fears,
Her fair foundations set:
And looking backward now, through years
Of steady gain, how small appears
Her old estate!—and yet,
 
 
She dons no autocratic airs,
In scorn of humbler days,
But shapes her fortunes and affairs,
To match the civic wreath she wears
And justify her bays.
 
 
Honor and Truth her old renown:
Conservative of both,
The virtues of the little town
She holds in legacy, to crown
The city's larger growth.
 
 
Nor ease nor sloth her strength despoil:
Her peaceful farmers till,
With patient thrift, th' outlying soil,
Her trained mechanics deftly toil,
Her merchants ply their skill;
 
 
Her ponderous engineries supply
A thousand waiting needs;
Her wheels revolve, her shuttles fly,—
And ever where the prize hangs high,
Her foot, unfaltering, leads.
 
 
Her sympathies are large and sweet:
And when, at Freedom's call,
The war flags waved, the war drums beat,
She sprang, responsive, to her feet,
And freely offered all!
 
 
Alert in War, she emulates
The Arts of Peace, as well:
Religion, Order, guard her gates;
Wealth, Culture, Thrift, like happy Fates,
Her destinies foretell.
 
 
So, through the round of years, she keeps
Advancing on her Past:
Her old-time vigor never sleeps,—
And even as she sows she reaps.
God bless her to the last!
 

Major General Lew Wallace At Shiloh

General U.S. Grant'S Vindication Of General Wallace.—The Wallace And Grant Letters And Documents With Introductory Note

By General Henry B. Carrington

[Author of "Battles of the American Revolution."]

It seems common to all great wars that the true version of leading actions is rarely assured by the immediate reports of commanders. Many causes secure to such reports substantial accuracy, but the development of details seldom fails to show that justice to subordinates cannot be done by the simple statement of general plans and general results. There are historians who still claim that Arnold had no part in the battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777; and many other battles of the Revolutionary war lacked clear definition until nearly a century had passed and the records were supplemented by careful examination of the battle-fields and a more thorough scrutiny of British, French, and Hessian archives, thereby to correct topographical data and harmonize conflicting statements.

The case of General Fitz John Porter forcibly illustrates the difficulty of changing public opinion, once formed, even when supplemental data enforce military recognition of their value. The Battle of Franklin, which secured to General Thomas the opportunity to fortify Nashville and ultimately defeat Hood, and the battles of Stone River, Gettysburg, Chicamauga and Monocacy, are among the actions of the late war in which differences of statement as to positions and movements have greatly qualified first estimates of the relations which various officers sustained to those actions.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, has been the latest under scrutiny. It is not the purpose to consider whether the action of the day was influenced by the arrival of Buel's army, or by the non-arrival of General Lew Wallace's division; nor whether General Wallace did, or did not, march by scientific methods, when he moved for the nearest firing. Among voluminous papers touching the civil war are the copies of original papers received from General Wallace himself, and of present interest. These papers received notice from the Western press at one time, but seem to demand a more formal record, as essential factors in the better understanding of the Battle of Shiloh.

The following outline is suggested by these documents:

1st. That the Federal line of battle, early in the morning, stretched out from Pittsburg Landing nearly to the Purdy Road, with General Sherman's division on the right, within about a mile of that road.

2nd. That General Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, not more than five miles from Pittsburg Landing; it being then uncertain which of the two would be the objective of attack.

3d. That General Grant visited General Wallace at Crump's Landing and ordered him to hold his command subject to orders, and then steamed onward to Pittsburg Landing.

4th. That before 6 o'clock, A.M., the sound of firing had led General Wallace to put his command under arms; and he was prepared to move wherever active work should demand, even before he was ordered to be thus ready.

5th. That he concentrated his brigades, then in three camps, into one mass, at the forks of the Purdy Road and the road to Pittsburg Landing, so that he might take either road, as orders should decide.

6th. That he understood the original line of battle and the disposition of its divisions, and knew that General Sherman held the right.

7th. That the order received by him, before 12 o'clock, M., from Captain Baxter, staff officer of General Grant, was in writing; and while pronounced verbally, at first, the form it assumed, when reduced to writing and subsequently delivered to General Wallace, was a direct order to "unite with the right," and that involved the march on the Purdy Road.

If the verbal order of General Grant to Captain Baxter, to hasten General Wallace's Division to Pittsburg Landing, was reduced to writing by that officer, after he noticed the early success of the Union Line, he would have shaped the approach of the fresh division to the best possible advantage, to join the army, not the precise Landing, if the army was not there; since General Grant, still being on crutches from a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work conflict.

8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General Wallace and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving the enemy at every point.

9th. That a movement at that time, toward Pittsburg Landing, would have taken General Wallaces' Division out of possible contact with the enemy, instead of supporting, and perfecting victory.

10th. That when the Division of General Wallace moved, as it did, within ten minutes after receipt of the orders, "impatiently waited for," it could see the distant smoke and hear the roar of battle, and moved directly toward the point of danger by the shortest route, with the greatest celerity and in harmony with the order received.

11th. That the defeat of the main army, the enforced retirement of Sherman's Division, and, in fact, the withdrawal of the entire original line, were new conditions, to be considered, when other Staff Officers notified General Wallace of the same; and then, the addition of his division to the rallying army, at Pittsburg Landing, seemed to be an important element to the very safety of that army, except as it could lean upon the divisions of Buel, already within supporting distance.

12th. That the original advance of General Wallace's Division on the Purdy Road, while thoroughly suited to the original conditions as they existed when the order was delivered to him, was, of necessity, useless and dangerous, when he found himself alone and unsupported, and that the enemy had already swept over the position which he expected to occupy.

13th. That there was no alternative, then, but to pass around the left of the enemy, and rejoin the army, at such expense of time or labor as the new conditions imposed; and that this was done, at great pains and with great celerity, without straggling or loss.

14th. That the prominent idea of withdrawing General Wallace's Division from Crump's Landing, to support the main army in its advance, is to be kept in mind;—whereby, confusion ceases as to the hour of the day when the order to report at Pittsburg Landing was delivered or became operative;—thereby, also, reconciling memories with the incidents of the day, with no discredit to any.

15th. That every theory of supporting an advanced line, from reserves sent forward from the base, must so bend to facts, that it may be the best thing possible, to strengthen the right of a successful line, even to overlapping and turning the enemy; and that such a movement has the emphatic endorsement of standard critics, and marked experience; while a formal movement to the rear, in order to move to the front and the right, as if on parade, would, under conditions such as presented to General Wallace, have been, simply, to wear out his men in marching, with small chance for taking any part in the assumed pursuit of a defeated enemy.

16th. That it is an unsound way of dealing with the facts of history, to gauge the responsibilities of officers and men, of small experience, by the rules which apply to the same officers and men after their experience has matured; and that, when the battle of Shiloh took place, and citizen regiments took part, with very slight knowledge of arms, it was equally true, that the officers themselves, both regular and volunteer, were proportionately unfamiliar with battle action on a large scale, and that, as a matter of fact, the Generals and Colonels, for the most part, had never seen a batallion drill, unless at West Point, much less drilled more than a company; and their conduct and opinions, in 1861-2, are not to be measured by the ripened experience of the years succeeding and succeeding years of reflection.

And finally, that the orders, movements, and results of the sixth day of April, 1862, must be judged by their relations to the passing hours and issues of that day, as practical men would act under changing conditions, and not by any formal order, which, however appropriate at one time, would, at any other time, defeat the work in hand. The Rules of Evidence, recognized by Civil and Military Courts alike, are but expressions of sound judgment of past experience; and Military Science, so called, has no other basis than that which belongs to the wise use of means to ends in all applied science and in all human endeavor. Whenever, therefore, the conduct of a battle is consistent with the conditions, as at the time understood, it is not exactly just to measure it by the terms of any instructions inconsistent with those conditions;—so that while an order to march to Pittsburg Landing became necessary upon the retirement of the original line, it ought not to be technically applied back to a time when that line was supposed to be sweeping on to victory and only sought fresh strength to mature that victory.

That a general action was precipitated by the Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney Johnson and was in the nature of a successful surprise of the Union Army, is the fact which harmonizes the reports of officers of both armies with the incidents of the day, and fairly distributes responsibility, without reflecting the narrow escape of the Union Army from destruction upon any single officer or command; especially, where all did so well, and so much is to be credited to the fall of General Johnson and the interruption of his deliberate plan, first to surprise, and then sweep on to victory, at whatever cost.

The Documents are as follows:

1st. Letter of Major General Lew Wallace to General U.S. Grant, February 26, 1869.

2nd. Letter of Lieutenant Colonel Ross, A.D.C. to General Wallace, January 25, 1868.

3rd. Letter of General J.A. Strickland to General Wallace, January 24, 1868.

4th. Letter of General G.F. McGinnis to General Wallace, February 20, 1868.

5th. Letter of General Fred. Knefler to General Wallace, February 19, 1868.

6th. Letter of Captain Ad Ware, A.D.C., to General Wallace (without date).

7th. Letter of General John M. Thayer to General Wallace, March 4, 1868.

8th. Letter of General U.S. Grant to General Wallace, March 10, 1868, commenting upon the letters cited and suggesting their publication, in justice to General Wallace.

The map of the Compte de Paris has been utilized. 1, 2 and 3 give location of Wallace's Brigades in line, perpendicular to the river, with right at Adamsville (3), 2. Concentration of Division. 4. Crossing at Snake creek to take the right of General Sherman. 4-5. Countermarch to lower crossing after retirement of the right. 6. Lower crossing which had for several days previously been under water. Wallace's division, on the 7th, held the right of Sherman, as indicated for the 6th, when he moved to take part in the general action.

General Wallace to General Grant:

WASHINGTON CITY, Feb. 29, 1868.

GENERAL:

About a year after the battle of Pittsburg Landing, it came to my knowledge, that I was suffering, in your opinion, from erroneous information upon the subject of my conduct and movements as commander of the Third Division of your army during the first day of the battle named. To place myself right in your estimation and in that of the army generally, I asked a Court of Inquiry, by letter to the Secretary of War (Mr. Stanton) July 17, 1863. After several months, during which the application received no attention from the Secretary, I withdrew it, by advice of friends, General Sherman amongst others. The course I then resolved upon, that counselled by General Sherman, was to carry my explanation directly to you; and such continued my intention until the battle of Monocacy, after which your treatment of me became so uniformly kind and considerate that I was led to believe the disagreement, connected with Pittsburg Landing, forgotten; a result, to which I tacitly assented, notwithstanding the record of that battle as you had made it, in the form of an endorsement on my official report, was grievously against me.

A recent circumstance, however, has made it essential to my good name, which I cannot bring myself to believe you wish to see destroyed, to go back to my former purpose; in pursuance of which, the object of this letter is simply to introduce certain statements of gentlemen lately in the army, your friends as much as mine, in hopes that the explanations to be found therein will be sufficent to authorize you to give me a note of acquittal from blame, plainly enough, to allay the suspicions and charges to which I have been so painfully subjected. The statements are in the form of extracts pertinent to the subject from letters now in my possession, from General Fred Knefler, General George McGinnis, Colonel James R. Ross, General Daniel MacCaulay, Captain Ad Ware, General John A. Strickland, General John M. Thayer, now United States Senator from Nebraska—all, of my command, on the day in question, present with me, well known to you, and of unimpeachable honor. I could have obtained many others, of like import, but selected these because their authors had peculiar opportunities for information upon points considered of chief importance. It is possible that my explanations of the matter would be sufficient for the purpose in view. However that may be, it is my judgment now, that the charges against me have gone so far, and been put in such grave form, that public opinion may require an exoneration, though it come from your hand, to be based upon the testimony of others.

Permit me to say, further, that as to the order you started to me by Captain Baxter, I do not understand there is any question of veracity between us. You tell me, that from the battle-field you dispatched a verbal order by the officer named, to be delivered to me, at Crump's Landing, directing me to march my division to Pittsburg Landing by the road, parallel with the river; and, supposing, as you did, that the order would reach me by 11 o'clock, A.M., you reasonably concluded my command would be on the field by 1 o'clock, P.M.

Now in all candor, if you have been, as I am informed, of opinion that I received that order as it was given, and at the time stated (11 o'clock, A.M.), and that for any reason, such as personal feeling against you, or that I lost my way, or took the wrong road, or lingered on the march, making but five miles in seven hours, it must be admitted that you were justifiable in any, even the most extreme judgment against me; and I must confess that your moderation was greater than mine would likely have been, had our positions been reversed. I do not flinch from that conclusion, at all; but what I do say in my defence is that the opinion and the conclusion, which is its corollary, are both wrong, because the order admitted to have been dispatched was not delivered to me, in form or substance, as dispatched. On the contrary, the order I received from your messenger was in writing, unsigned, and contained substantially the following instructions:

"You will leave a force at Crump's Landing, sufficient to guard the public property there; then march the rest of your division, and effect a junction with the right of the army; after which you will form your line of battle at right angles with the river, and act as circumstances dictate."

This order was read by Colonel Ross, under circumstances well calculated to impress it upon his memory. It was also given to Colonel Knefler, then my Adjutant General, and by him read and unfortunately lost. Finally, its purport, as stated by me above, is vouched for by Captain Ware as the aide de camp. To refuse credit to my version of its contents will be very hard, indeed, corroborated as it is by so many gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, and such excellent opportunity for information on the point.

I think myself warranted now in asserting upon the credit of the three officers just named, as well as my own, that by the terms of the order, as it was delivered to me, the object of my march was not Pittsburg Landing, as you intended, but the right of the army, resting, when the battle opened in the morning, at a point quite three miles out from the landing, on the road to Purdy.

As a general principle it must be admitted that when you entrusted the order to a proper messenger for delivery to me, your responsibility ceased; but, I turn and ask you, appealing to your experience and justice, how am I held responsible for the execution of an order if it never reached me; or, if it reached me, conveying an idea radically different from that originally given? Of necessity, I was accountable for the execution of the order, only as it was received, and if it was not received in a form to convey your true design, but was promptly executed, neither of us are responsible for the result. It was not your mistake, nor was it mine.

Having established the purport, at least, of the order as it came to my hand, the next inquiry is: "Did I proceed to execute it, and how?"

On these heads all the letters on file are applicable. They show, as I think, that I took measures anticipatory to the order you gave me, personally, in your passage up the river to the battle-field, viz: to hold myself in readiness to march in any direction; that my brigades were ordered to concentrate at the place most proper and convenient for a prompt execution of the orders, whatever they might be, because it was at the junction of two roads, one leading to Pittsburg Landing, the other to the right of the army. To one of these points, it may be added, I was sure of being ultimately sent, if the exigencies of the battle required the presence of my command. They show, that after you parted from me, going up the river, I took measures to forward your messenger to me instantly upon his arrival (see Colonel Ross' letters), then rode to the place of concentration, and waited impatiently and anxiously the expected instructions; that they came to hand about 12 o'clock (my own remembrance is 11:30 A.M.), and that the officer who brought them, also brought the news that you were driving the enemy all along the line. (See letters of General Knefler and Colonel Ross.) Up to that time, therefore, I was certainly blameless.

But let me ask you to stop here, and consider the effect on my mind and subsequent movements, of the information, thus reliably obtained, that the battle was won. What inducement could I have had to march away from or linger on the road to a victory? Upon the hypothesis that the good news was true, how could I have imagined, (had there been so much as a doubt as to the intent of the order received,) a necessity for my command at Pittsburg Landing?

But, proceeding. The letters further establish, that, immediately upon receiving the order, I put my column en route, to execute it.

Now comes the questions. Did I take the right road to effect the junction with the right of the army, or one leading to Purdy, away from the battle? Pertinent to these inquiries, General Knefler says, that the road chosen for the movement had been patrolled and picketted by my cavalry. By their report, if by nothing else, I must have been posted as to its terminus. In corroboration of this assertion please notice that General Macaulay, General Strickland, General Thayer and General Knefler, all allude to the fact that the head of the column was approaching, not going away from the firing, when the countermarch took place. Consider, further, that the most imperative necessities of my situation, isolated as I had been from the main army, were, to know all the communications with that army, and to keep them clear, and in order for rapid movement. Not only did I know the road, but every step my division took from the initial point of the march up to the moment of the change of direction, was, as is well known to every soldier in the column, a step nearer to the firing and therefore a step nearer to the battle. While on this inquiry, let me add that the report of my being set right after marching upon the wrong road has in it this much truth, and no more. When about a mile from the position which had been occupied by the right of the army (General Sherman's division), Captain Rowley overtook me and told me that you had sent him to hurry me up, and that our lines had been carried by the enemy and the army driven back almost to the river, a very different story from the one brought me by Captain Baxter. Captain Rowley set me right as to the conditions of the battle, not as to the road I was following. Colonel McPherson and Major Rawlins, the other members of your staff, mentioned as having been sent to me, met me after the countermarch, when my command was on the river road moving to Pittsburg Landing.

 

Concerning the countermarch, I would remark that the condition of the battle, as reported by Captain Rowley, made it prudent, if not necessary. My column was only five thousand men, of all arms. Reflecting upon it now, I am still of the opinion that it did better service the next day in your new line of battle, than it could have done, operating alone and unsupported in the rear of the whole rebel army, where I was certainly taking it, when "set right" by the captain.

Instead of making the change of direction, when it was resolved on, by a countermarch, the result proved that it should have been effected by a general right about. The former manoeuvre was chosen, however, because I was confident of finding a cross road to the river road long before the head of the column doubled upon its foot. [See Colonel Ross' statement of the effort made to accomplish that idea.]

One of the results I confidently anticipated from a reading of the letter submitted, is, that you will be satisfied of the wrong done me (unintentional, I believe), by Colonel Badeau, when, in his book, he describes me as consuming seven hours in marching five miles in the direction of the battle. The march actually performed in that time was not less than fifteen miles, over an execrable dirt road.

Your opinion, as advanced in your letter to the War Office, July, 13, 1863, that General Morgan L. Smith, had he been put in command, could have had the division in the battle by 1 o'clock P.M., is in direct terms, based upon the condition that General Smith received your orders as you supposed them communicated to me. But, suppose he had not received the order as originally given; suppose, on the contrary, the order actually received by him had the effect to send him in another direction from Pittsburg Landing; and suppose that, on approaching his objective, he had found himself in the rear of the whole rebel army, and in his judgment compelled, by that circumstance, together with the bad fortune of our own army, to a further movement of quite ten miles—all of which were terrible realities in my case—I am sure you are too just a man to have held him accountable for the hours, however precious, thus necessarily lost.

With these remarks I place the letters of the officers named in your hands. They will satisfy you, I think, that the exoneration I seek will be a simple act of justice. The many misconceptions which have been attached to my movements on that bloody Sunday, have, it must be confessed, made me extremely sensitive upon the subject. You can imagine, therefore, with what anxiety your reply will be waited.

Very respectfully your friend,

LEW WALLACE.

To GENERAL U.S. GRANT, WASHINGTON CITY.

Colonel Ross to General Wallace:

CHICAGO, January, 25, 1868.

General: Having read the extract from "Badeau's Life of General Grant," as published in the Chicago Tribune, of the twenty-fifth of December, 1867, wherein he refers particularly to the battle of Shiloh, and seeing the gross injustice done you, and the false light in which you are placed before the country and the world, I deem it my duty to make a brief statement of what I know to be the facts in reference to your failure to reach the field of battle in time to take part in the action of Sunday, April 6, 1862.

I will first state the position of your command on that morning. The First Brigade, Colonel M.L. Smith commanding, at Crump's Landing; Second Brigade, Colonel John M. Thayer commanding, two and one-half miles out on the Adamsville road; Third Brigade, Colonel Charles R. Wood commanding, at Adamsville, five miles out from the river. The first intimation you or any of your staff had of the battle was between five and six o'clock, A.M., when my attention was called by one of the men on the boat on which were your headquarters, to the heavy and continued firing in the direction of the camp at Pittsburg Landing. You were at once notified of this, and being satisfied that there was a battle going on, directed me to go at once and order this division to get ready to move at a moment's warning, and to instruct Colonel Wood to move his baggage and camp equipage to the river with the least possible delay, and march his command to the camp of the Second Brigade, midway between his (then) camp and that of the First Brigade, at the river.

After executing your order, as above, I returned to the Landing. Soon after, you, together with your staff, went out to the camp of the second Brigade, when the division had been ordered to concentrate in order to be in position to take either one of two roads, intersecting the Adamsville road from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing; one leading to Pittsburg Landing, the other to the Purdy road from Pittsburg Landing, intersecting it at a point not far from the right of our army under General Sherman, as it was encamped when the battle began.

Before starting for Colonel Thayer's camp, orders were given by you to Captain Lyman, A.Q.M., on your staff, for a horse to be saddled and kept in readiness, in case a messenger should come down the river with orders from General Grant to you.

Now for the order. Badeau says that a staff officer was dispatched to General Wallace with verbal orders for him to march by the nearest road parallel with the river. The order may have been given verbally by General Grant to his staff officer, but was not so delivered to you, nor did it direct you to march by the nearest road parallel with the river. At about 11 o'clock, A.M., while at the camp of Colonel Thayer, I was directed by you to go to Colonel M.L. Smith. I met Captain Baxter, A.Q.M., who stopped me and handed me a paper saying, "I wish you would take this to General Wallace." I took the paper, read it and returned it to him, saying, I could not do so, as I was on my way under orders from General Wallace. At the same time I turned in my saddle, and pointed out a group of horsemen, telling the Captain that you were among them. I went to Colonel Smith, delivered my orders, and returning, met the Captain again. I very distinctly remember that this order directed you to move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy road and form your line of battle at right angles with the river; and then act as circumstances would dictate. Now the shortest possible route by which you could reach the point designated in the order was the one taken, viz: that one leading from Colonel Thayer's camp (on the Adamsville road from Crump's Landing), to the Purdy road (from Pittsburg Landing), a distance of about five miles; whereas the distance to the point to which you was to march as designated in the order, via Pittsburg Landing, would have been at least twelve miles. Perhaps I should here state that this order was not signed by any one, but coming as it did through one of the Staff Officers of the Commanding General, could not be questioned. I would also state in this connection, that when I met Captain Baxter first, I asked him how things were going. He replied that Grant was driving the enemy at all points. Had this been the case, the order as delivered by Captain Baxter would have been all right, as we could then have joined General Sherman as directed therein. Within ten minutes after the receipt of the order, the troops were on the road.

When we were about one mile from where we expected to join General Sherman, we were overtaken by a messenger from General Grant, Captain (since Colonel) Rowley, I believe, who informed you that our troops had been defeated all along the line, and driven back, till the right was within half a mile of the river, and that the road we were on, would, if followed up, lead us into the rear of the enemy. This being the case, it became necessary to find some other way to form a junction with the army. In order to do so, every mounted man attached to your Head-Quarters was dispatched to find, if possible, some way to get round the enemys' left without going back to the starting point, or to find some resident to guide us by the nearest possible route. Finally a man was found who was compelled to act as guide. Nevertheless the march was continued as rapidly as possible, until we joined the right of the army, just after dark, in the position in which it lay when the battle closed for the day. Badeau also says: "General Wallace was set right by Captain (afterwards Colonel) Rowley, and Colonel (afterwards Major General) McPherson, both at the time upon General Grant's staff; that they set him right at 1 o'clock, and it took him till seven to march five miles." It was near 1 o'clock when we were overtaken by Rowley, but instead of having but five miles to march, the distance could not have been less than eleven or twelve miles. The first seen of General McPherson was when we were met by him and General Rawlins, just as the head of the column had reached the river road (from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing) who had come out to urge you to greater haste. We had to march over the worst road I ever remember to have seen. In many places it was almost impossible to get artillery through. In my judgment the entire distance marched by your command could not have been less than sixteen or seventeen miles.

The above, General, are the facts relative to the movements of your command on the day referred to, which fell under my personal observation. I am, General, very respectively, your obedient servant,

JAMES R. ROSS,

Late Brev. Lieut. Col. Major. A.D.C.

To MAJOR GENERAL LEW WALLACE

CRAWFORDSVILLE, Indiana.

General Strickland to General Wallace: