Read the book: «Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)», page 138

Mr. McKee moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.

Monday, January 11

Additional Military Force

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men for one year.

Mr. Sheffey said he felt grateful for the opportunity which had been afforded him, to deliver his sentiments on the subject before the committee. It was now about a year ago, when he had stated his reasons at length on the question of the war then meditated against Great Britain. Since that time, he had been generally a silent, though not an inattentive spectator. Conscious that there had fallen to his share a full portion of the frailty common to man, he felt disposed to distrust his own opinion. He had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had hoped that experience would prove the fallacy of his apprehensions; that the predictions of gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment, would be realized; that the rights of the country would be secured by arms, to which the majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated would vanish before us. On a review, however, of the reasons which had then influenced him, aided by the experience of the last year, he found his opinions, not only unshaken, but strongly confirmed.

The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates an addition of twenty thousand men to the army heretofore authorized to be raised. By the measures preparatory to the war, upwards of thirty-six thousand men were directed to be enlisted; with the addition now contemplated, our regular army will amount to more than fifty-six thousand men. The question which at once presents itself to every mind disposed to inquire, is, what is the object of this vast military force? We are here not left to conjecture; this inquiry has been anticipated, and we have been directly told by the chairman of the Military Committee, (Mr. Williams,) that it is intended for offensive purposes; that the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is to be achieved. If I have any right to deliberate on this subject, and to express the opinion which my view of the real interests of the country dictates, I at once say, that I cannot give my assent to raise such a force for such a purpose. Was an augmentation of the army required to defend us against any enemy, either on the maritime or inland frontier, no member of this House would more readily accord the means of defence and protection than myself. In such event, I shall not inquire how we got into the situation, or by whose temerity the enemy has been brought on our borders. I shall consider defence as a matter of imperious necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means and consequences. But, as it is admitted by all, that the force already authorized is more than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as it is expressly avowed that it is required for offensive operations in the territories of the enemy, the question assumes a different shape; it is stripped of the overruling influence which attends necessity; it becomes a mere question of expediency, controlled by the various considerations which reason and policy may dictate. So far as my conduct is concerned, before I can consent to the prosecution of the war, in the manner contemplated, I must be convinced that the objects in controversy are not only just, but of sufficient importance in their practical effect on the community to justify such an experiment, and not attainable in any other way; that there is a reasonable probability that such a war will secure to us those objects; and that we are not endangering the greater good, to obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding certain great rights, to secure others of far inferior importance.

I regret that I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, yield the unlimited confidence in their measures, which the majority demand. My reason must be convinced, before my confidence can be bestowed. There are, indeed, cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested by long and successful experience, have a strong claim to our confidence. But this, in my opinion, is not the case here. A retrospect of the transactions of the last eight years, will show how much gentlemen have been mistaken and disappointed in their views of our foreign policy; particularly that part which is connected with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves, and which may be said to be the groundwork of them. In making this declaration, and in leading your attention to the facts, it is not my object to give offence to any one. I believe gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives, and sincerely disposed to render essential service to the country. I speak of facts only, intending to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or vicious course.

Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced soon after the treaty of 1794 (generally called "Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation, in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About that time the British Government offered to our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal of the treaty. That instrument had been negotiated under the auspices, and received the sanction of Washington, the father and benefactor of his country. It is true, that its stipulations did not embrace every subject which we could have wished; and those that were embraced, were not so advantageously settled as might have been done, had we had it in our power to have dictated the terms. But it is equally true, that experience refuted all the speculations, and dissipated all the apprehensions, with which the country was filled at the time of its ratification. During its operation we enjoyed a degree of prosperity unexampled in this or any other country. Our leading interests flourished in a manner unknown before, and unexperienced since; our agriculture was encouraged by high prices and ready markets for its products; the freedom of navigation, and the enterprise of our people, carried our commerce to every part of the globe. I ask this House and this nation, whether their hopes or wishes extend beyond what we then enjoyed? If they do, they hope for that which is opposed by all human probability, and they wish for that which has scarcely ever fallen to the lot of man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every evil, or gratified by every possible good. What nation or individual ever reached that state? But the great essentials of national prosperity were in our possession. Our Government, however, was not satisfied. The overture of the British Government was rejected, under the impression, no doubt, that better terms could be obtained; that the situation of Great Britain would compel her to yield to our demands, however extensive.

Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great Britain assumed the right to interdict the trade in the products of her enemies' colonies, when taken directly from those colonies to the mother country, conformably, as she asserted, to the principles adopted in the war of 1756. In consequence of which, our Government, with a view to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions, passed the partial non-importation act of 1806. It had not the intended and promised effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and repealed the restriction. About this time, a change happened in the British Cabinet, highly auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes, our old friends, who had espoused our cause in time of peril and danger, who had defended our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution, and who had manifested their friendship for us on every occasion since, got into power. With these men, a negotiation was opened by our Government through the instrumentality of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own Ministers declared, "both honorable and advantageous to the United States," and the best that could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous" as it respected our commerce, but the informal understanding which accompanied it, would have secured us against the abuses of impressments; so our own Ministers believed. But it was rejected without being even submitted to the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed to the nation. I presume, however, that it was confidently expected that such was the situation of Great Britain, that any terms that we should dictate would be granted.

The terms which our Government demanded not being accorded on the part of Great Britain, a new policy was resorted to by our Government, which was held up to the nation as a sovereign remedy for all our difficulties, which were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited in its duration, was laid on our shipping. The prominent virtues of this remedy were supposed to be – that it would coerce the belligerents, but particularly Great Britain, into an abandonment of their injurious measures; and above all, that it would save us from being involved in war. The experience of one year, however, manifested how little its supporters understood of the means and resources of other nations, and of the character of our own. The privations to which a great portion of our people were subjected in consequence of this measure coerced our Government into a repeal, long before any sensible impression could be made on Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned, because the people would bear it no longer, and the non-intercourse system was adopted in its stead. This also had its day – but this, like the embargo, experience condemned as injurious and ruinous policy; and the public voice called for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of the first of May, 1810, the source of our present difficulties.

When this act passed this House, we were told that its provisions held out the strongest inducement to each of the great belligerents, to precede its rival in the abrogation of the injurious edicts affecting the commerce of this country, and that whoever might lead the other would unquestionably follow. It required very little sagacity to penetrate this subject. It was easily foreseen that this measure would be employed to detach us from our neutral situation, which it was so much our interest, and had been so much our desire, to maintain. This apprehension experience has realized. We now feel the consequences in their fullest extent.

After we had become the dupes of French perfidy, by putting in force the non-importation system against Great Britain, under the belief, that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed, the falsehood of which has since been placed beyond all rational doubt, it happened as had been anticipated, that finding the inefficiency of the restrictive system against Great Britain, the nation was called on, about the commencement of last session, to assume a threatening attitude towards that power. We were then told by the supporters of our foreign policy, that war would not be necessary. That justice was withheld from us by the Government of that nation under the impression that force would not be used to maintain our rights, which impression it was only necessary to remove by manifesting a determined spirit in making warlike preparations. This prevailed with many, and the army was voted. But it did not intimidate our enemy. We were then told, that it was necessary to declare war, as affording conclusive evidence of our sincerity: but that it would not be necessary to continue it beyond a few weeks, when our objects would be attained by a just and honorable peace. We were also told, at the same time, that in six weeks after the declaration of war, we should be in possession of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All these promises have been disappointed. We have effected nothing by commercial restrictions, nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation; and, if there is not a change in our policy, the war promises to be perpetual.

Having detained you thus long with these preliminary topics, permit me to draw your attention to those that grow directly out of the bill before the committee. I have said, that the causes ought not only to be just, but important in their effect on the community, to justify a resort to arms. I will say more. A nation situated as this is, who has so much to lose, and so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are the causes which existed at the time when this war was declared, of that character which, according to this idea, justified its commencement; and are those now remaining sufficient to sanction its continuance?

I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.

Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal which has since taken place had happened and been known here before we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority. The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any other object.

The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged. The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy, &c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French "municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance. The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce – when she adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.

The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. Clay,) because the right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations, and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the subject of impressments.

This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably an interesting subject. Not that I place entire confidence in the sympathetic descriptions of the magnitude of the evil, which we have so often heard and daily heard in this House. I am inclined to believe fancy has colored the picture too highly. There is one reason, above all others, which leads me to that conclusion. It is this: In that section of the United States of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives, there is a strong, overwhelming current of opinion against this war. Can it be possible that the country where dwells the kindred of those who are said to be incarcerated in great numbers in the "floating dungeons" of Great Britain is not only indifferent about the fate of its children, but opposes, as ruinous, the war waged for their protection? It is certainly a curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's rights come from those portions of the Union that have little commerce, and few, if any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that those gentlemen do wrong in espousing the cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter they may belong; but I state the fact to show that their sympathies may possibly have magnified the evil – and to infer from it, that the opposition of those most immediately interested is to be ascribed, not to their insensibility, but to their apprehensions that this war, instead of securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen into foreign service.

The controversy between this country and Great Britain seems to have been brought to a single point. She claims the service of her seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government admits this right. To give effect to the right thus claimed and admitted, she insists that her officers may go on board our merchant ships on the high seas, or in her ports – search for and take her subjects. This our Government deny, and claim the immunity of the flag so far as persons are concerned; because, under the pretext of taking British subjects, American citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed, not distinctly appear in the late communication from our Executive to the British Government, that they mean by the terms American citizens, whether it includes naturalized persons as well as natives. With respect to those of the first description, I confess I feel no great interest for their immunity abroad or on the high seas; I am one of those who think that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer them any asylum from the oppression or poverty of their own country, receive them into our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages belonging to us; and so long as they remain within our territorial limits, they shall, with my consent, have the full benefit of the protection which our laws afford to all. But I cannot consent that the native blood of this country shall be profusely wasted to protect aliens born, wherever they may ramble. We all profess a deep solicitude for the interest of seamen. To describe their distresses and to eulogize their valor and patriotism, is one of the topics of the day. And yet we are contending for principles which, if successful, will bring a host of foreigners in competition with them to elbow them out of employment. But it is said that Great Britain does the same – that by the act passed during the reign of George II., foreign seamen are naturalized who have been in the King's service for two years, and that she has no right to object if we imitate her conduct. It is true she has adopted such a regulation. But I have never heard of any instance where she has contended that such a person is absolved from his natural allegiance, if he comes within the power of his original sovereign. I have understood that act to mean that such persons should become entitled to certain rights – not absolved from any duties towards others, should they leave the country. That they should have the right to hold lands – be admitted under the regulations of the navigation act as British seamen on board merchant ships, and participate in the pension and hospital provisions. Should I be mistaken, however, I am not inclined to relinquish my opinion, merely because the practice of Great Britain is opposed to it.

Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration for insisting on the immunity of our flag, as it respects the seamen. I approve of the principle. It is of that character which at a proper time and with proper means is (in effect and to all general purposes) attainable, if we do not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate it. It is supposed that the present is the auspicious moment to insist on our rights. That pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful enemy the world ever saw, who threatens her very existence; the impression which we can make upon her by our arms, will be greater than at any other time. This very circumstance renders the attainment of our object more difficult, and makes our case hopeless. Her danger forbids a compliance with our demands. In her present struggle, her naval power constitutes her security. Without that she would long since have become a French province. This every man in England knows and feels. It is well known that four-fifths of her seamen on board her navy render not voluntary but compulsory service. Should this principle be established, which in all cases would afford a secure asylum in our merchant ships, it is dreaded by British statesmen and the British people, that their seamen, allured by higher wages and easier employment, would abandon their service, and thus render their country accessible to their enemy. Hence you see every Ministry, of whatever political party or distinction, tremblingly alive to this subject. They dare not touch it in the present state of that country. No man could maintain his power a moment after having hazarded the public safety by making an experiment, the effect of which could not be foreseen, and may be productive of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is manifest in all the communications from the British Cabinet to our Government. We have seen the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland, Lord Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions were in our favor, and who on almost every other subject supported our pretensions. On this subject they resisted our demands, because they dared not grant them. While I conceive the claims of our Government as not going too far, I doubt their prudence as to the time and manner of giving them effect. I fear that instead of realizing our wishes the measures pursued are calculated to deprive us of every hope hereafter. In the present unexampled state of the world, according to my limited conception of our true interest, we ought to have seriously avoided all hostile collision with foreign powers. We ought to have cherished the resources within our grasp. Nothing is more obvious than the remark made by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Bleecker,) that, with all the injuries which we received from the belligerents, our commerce was more extensive and more profitable in the aggregate than if Europe had been at peace. We might have obtained (and we ought not to have rejected) such temporary arrangements with England, (with whom our commerce was chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not embrace all our interests, would have secured those of first importance and kept us at peace. The benefits of such a policy are to my mind self-evident. Should Europe be restored to tranquillity and assume something like its former appearance, (and I do not believe the present state of things durable,) we should have been able to have effected every valuable object, because such a change will probably bring with it a respect for the rights of nations, which have now no existence but in name. And should an imposing attitude have been wanting to give effect to our claims, we should have exhibited an unbroken spirit and unexhausted resources.

An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy,) the other day, read some extracts from the instructions transmitted to our Minister in London, in 1792. His object was to show the deep interest which the great man who then presided over this nation felt on the subject of impressments. I sincerely wish that while gentlemen resort to his opinions to support theirs, they would consent to imitate his conduct. Nothing can be more strikingly different than his policy and that which is now pursued.

In 1793 the subject of impressments did not form the only complaint against Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on her part. To that was added the great injury which our commerce sustained by the extensive captures made by her cruisers during that year. The interest which was felt for the success of the French Revolution, against which Great Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs, and ripen it for war. But the wisdom of Washington saved us from being drawn into the vortex, which has since devoured all who approached it. His genius considered the true interests of his country to consist in the preservation of its peace; and he had firmness enough to preserve it, though opposed by the strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding the accumulated wrongs which we had received, he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately gave his assent to a treaty in which there was not one stipulation even to restrain the abuses of impressments, which the year before he had declared could not be longer tolerated. Why was this done by him, who, to say the least, had as much affection for his country's rights, as the politicians of the present day – whom fear never influenced – and who could safely calculate on the support of the people, should he resort to arms? The answer is obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was better than a hopeless, endless contest. What a contrast does his example present to the conduct of those who now direct the destinies of this nation, and who, while they reject his policy, resort to his opinions to support their own?

Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects connected with it, the opinions of gentlemen of the majority have certainly undergone a strange revolution since they came into power. Little more than twelve years ago, they deprecated foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, and the genius of our Government. Nothing short of self-defence, when attacked in our own country, was considered as a justification for abandoning our peaceful pursuits, and mingling in hostility with European powers. Every other object was deemed subordinate to the preservation of peace, because with it was connected every benefit which it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us, and which our detached situation rendered secure. We now hear those very gentlemen talk of Rome and Greece in their proudest days, when they inspired terror into the inhabitants of distant climes and carried their arms to every quarter of the globe; and their example is held up for our imitation. The almost boundless extent of our territory is become too limited, and we hear of conquests in the North and South, as essential to our security and happiness. In taking a retrospect, and contrasting former opinions with present conduct, a person would almost be inclined to distrust his observation, was there not left on record monuments with sentiments of former times entertained by gentlemen in the days of humility, when they were struggling against power. Permit me to call your attention to a resolution of the Virginia Assembly, adopted in 1798, said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now President of the United States, upon this subject. It was then considered the standard of Republican opinion, by all who professed to be of that party. It in substance declares, that though the General Assembly view with indignation the violations of our commerce, the impressment of our seamen, and other wrongs committed by foreign nations, yet detached as the United States are from European concerns, they should deprecate a war waged for any other object except self-defence, in cases of actual invasion. This resolution had an eye to our relations with France, from whom we had then received every injury and indignity she could inflict, and with whom we were in a state of partial hostility; but it explicitly declares, that we ought to engage in offensive war, for no object whatever. Let the sentiment be compared with the conduct of the same men now they are in power.

Sir, I am one of those who doubt our capacity to obtain the conquest of the British provinces. I believe that the opinion, that we are a very powerful nation abroad, is a fanciful delusion. To be powerful abroad, requires a Government of sufficient energy, not only to bring into action all the physical and pecuniary resources of the country, but to command them promptly. The very nature of our Government, where every thing depends immediately upon the people, forbids the idea that you can effect one or the other. The inconveniences and privations to which they must be subjected, are sufficient causes with the great body of the community, who do not perceive very distinctly how they are to be benefited by an offensive war, to turn their faces against it. Their Representatives, knowing their feelings, dare not press them with a heavy hand, which at once destroys every thing like energy. Besides, the want of promptitude, the characteristic defect of such a Government, whose powers are divided into many hands, prevents the resources even within their reach to be obtained and applied in time to insure success. The consequence of all this is – imbecility in obtaining, and want of celerity in applying the necessary means. This may be considered as a very great evil, particularly to those who have presented to us the example of Rome in her proudest days, when she was mistress of the world, for our imitation. Sir, I rejoice that such is the state of my country. It is the legitimate offspring of our free institutions. The people are strong and the Government is weak; whenever this state of things shall be reversed, then shall we be able to inspire terror into other nations. But until that period shall arrive, we shall exhibit weakness and slowness of action, as to all offensive and external purposes.