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Friday, December 11

Macedonian and Frolic

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States:

I transmit to Congress copies of a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, from Captain Decatur, of the frigate "United States," reporting his combat and capture of the British frigate Macedonian. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on that officer and his companions on board, for the consummate skill and conspicuous valor by which this trophy has been added to the naval arms of the United States.

I transmit, also, a letter from Captain Jones, who commanded the sloop-of-war Wasp, reporting his capture of the British sloop-of-war, the Frolic, after a close action, in which other brilliant titles will be seen to the public admiration and praise.

A nation feeling what it owes to itself and to its citizens could never abandon to arbitrary violence on the ocean, a class of them which gives such examples of capacity and courage, in defending their rights on that element; examples which ought to impress on the enemy, however brave and powerful, a preference of justice and peace, to hostility against a country whose prosperous career may be accelerated, but cannot be prevented, by the assaults made on it.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, December 11, 1812.

U. S. ship United States, at sea

October 30, 1812.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that, on the 25th instant, being in the latitude 29° north, longitude 29° 30´ west, we fell in with, and, after an action of one hour and a half, captured His Britannic Majesty's ship Macedonian, commanded by Captain John Carden, and mounting forty-nine carriage guns, (the odd gun shifting.) She is a frigate of the largest class, two years old, four months out of the dock, and reputed one of the best sailers in the British service. The enemy being to windward, had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance; which was so great that, for the first half hour, we did not use our carronades, and at no moment was he within the complete effect of our musketry or grape. To this circumstance, and a heavy swell which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action.

The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman, and marine, on board this ship, on discovering the enemy, their steady conduct in battle, and the precision of their fire, could not be surpassed. Where all have met my fullest expectations it would be unjust in me to discriminate. Permit me, however, to recommend to your particular notice my first lieutenant, William H. Allen; he has served with me upwards of five years, and to his unremitted exertions in disciplining the crew is to be imputed the obvious superiority of our gunnery exhibited in the result of this contest.

Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on both sides. Our loss, compared with that of the enemy, will appear small. Among our wounded you will observe the name of Lieutenant Funk, who died a few hours after the action; he was an officer of great gallantry and promise, and the service sustained a severe loss in his death.

The Macedonian lost her mizzenmast, fore and main-topmasts, and main-yard, and was much cut up in her hull.

The damage sustained by this ship was not such as to render her return into port necessary; and had I not deemed it important that we should see our prize in, should have continued our cruise.

With the highest consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient humble servant.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

Hon. Paul Hamilton.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States

Thomas Brown, New York, seaman; Henry Shepherd, Philadelphia, seaman; William Murray, Boston, boy; Michael O'Donnel, New York, private marine; John Roberts, private marine —killed.

John Mercer Funk, Philadelphia, lieutenant, (since dead;) John Archibald, New York, carpenter's crew; Christian Clark, ditto, seaman; George Christopher, ditto, ordinary seaman; George Mahar, ditto ditto; William James, ditto ditto; John Lawton, ditto, private marine —wounded.

On board the Macedonian there were thirty-six killed, and sixty-eight wounded; among the former, were the boatswain, one master's mate, and the schoolmaster; and of the latter were the first and third lieutenants, one master's mate, and two midshipmen.

New York, November 24, 1812

Sir: I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the capture of the Wasp, on the 18th of October, by the Poictiers, of seventy-four guns, while a wreck from damages received in the engagement with the British sloop-of-war Frolic, of twenty-two guns, sixteen of them thirty-two-pound carronades, four twelve-pounders on the main deck, and two twelve-pound carronades on the top-gallant forecastle; making her superior in force to us by four twelve-pounders. The Frolic had struck to us, and was taken possession of two hours before our surrendering to the Poictiers.

We had left the Delaware on the 13th; the 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and two men; half-past eleven on the night of the 17th, in latitude 37 degrees north, and longitude 65 degrees west, we saw several sail, two of them appearing very large; we stood for them for some time, then shortened sail, and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight, on Sunday the 18th, we saw them ahead; gave chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a sloop-of-war; four of them large ships, mounting from sixteen to eighteen guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven A. M., we engaged the sloop-of-war, having first received her fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well-supported fire of forty-three minutes; and although so near, while loading our last broadside, that our rammers were shoved against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecastle, so that no loss was sustained on their side after boarding.

Our maintop-mast was shot away between four and five minutes from the commencement of the firing, and falling, together with the maintopsail-yard, across the larboard fore and fore-topsail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At eight minutes, the gaff and mizzen topgallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the beginning of the action every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell upon deck; the main-mast going close by the deck, and the foremast going twelve or fifteen feet above it.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rogers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, showed, by incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight, and every other officer, acted with a courage and promptitude highly honorable, and I trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had fallen on deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states that, from what he saw, and from information from the officers, the number killed must have been about thirty, and that of the wounded about forty or fifty; of the killed, is her first lieutenant and sailing-master; of the wounded, Captain Winyates, and the second lieutenant.

We had five killed and five wounded, as per list: the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained on deck, and showed, by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.

I am, respectfully, &c.

JACOB JONES.

Hon. Paul Hamilton.

The Message and documents having been read —

On motion of Mr. Randolph, they were referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, with instructions to report a suitable expression of the Legislative approbation of the services detailed.

Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to limit the committee to reporting a resolution; or to preclude them from expressing approbation in a more substantial manner.

Wednesday, December 16

Navy of the United States

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, which had been previously twice read in the House.

Mr. Sawyer made a motion to add the word "teen" to "four," so as to make it fourteen 74 gun ships.

Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the question whether we were to have a navy or not. He took the occasion to congratulate the House upon the repeated victories of our little navy over the enemy; and of the grateful prospect of a speedy termination to the despotism of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated, and all nations permitted to traverse their great highway in safety. The thing can be done; and if we say so, with the will of God, will be done. The experiment upon which the proof hangs has been made. British arms cannot withstand American upon the sea. The bully has been disgraced by an infant; and fear shall no longer restrain an abject world from vindicating its long violated rights. Give us but a respectable fleet, and it is all we ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours? They are a mere mockery. If we do mean to make a serious stand upon the ocean, such a force must be out of all character. If we mean merely to annoy her trade, (and he trusted we meant more,) frigates will do; but, to make any serious impression that way, we must have a respectable fleet; at least, in his opinion, fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would give us a preponderance on our own coast, and enable us to bring in our prizes with safety. Who can bear the idea of our being obliged to burn or sink all the ships we may take away from the enemy, for fear of their being recaptured? He thought we should save enough by the protection they would afford to our prizes to support the expense of them. We can easily support such a force. The expense, distributed over our widely-extended population, would be less than a dollar a head; and, where is the American who would grudge such a sum for such an object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully pay it, because we are now at war, and a navy is found the most efficient weapon in our hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted that if it was the disposition of the House to have a navy, they would establish such a one as would answer some purpose.

Mr. Seybert said he did not anticipate that the bill from the Senate would have been called for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval Committee; notwithstanding he had bestowed some attention on the subject, he confessed his remarks would be made in a manner not entirely satisfactory to himself; he would, however, proceed with them.

Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy to build, equip, and man the seventy-fours, as it will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as is proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina. So far from adding to the number of these ships, contemplated by the bill, he had intended to move that no seventy-four gun ships should be, at this time, authorized by the Legislature.

On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when a naval establishment was the subject under consideration, he stated at length his reasons for opposing the propositions before the House. The opinions which he then advanced concerning an extensively permanent naval establishment for the United States were still believed to be well grounded. He did not hesitate to declare his intention, at this time, and under the pressure of present circumstances, to yield much to general feelings, and the sentiments of the nation; nevertheless, he should guard against being carried too far by the current of popular opinion. It is equally my duty, said he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the permanent and vital national interest. He declared a uniform opposition to that establishment, which could not be brought within the means and resources of the nation to maintain it. We have made war, said he, to guarantee the honor and independence of the nation, as well as for the support of the just rights of our citizens; with these objects in view, he had consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000 men, and advocated one more numerous, though in principle he was opposed to standing armies. If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens deem an increase of the Naval Establishment essential to promote the great work, why should it be refused on my part? No opposition would be made by him to the principle or spirit of the bill before the House, though, he confessed, he did not approve the provisions as to the kind of force therein contemplated.

Mr. S. continued. – At this time our principal object should be, to authorize that species of force which can be furnished in the shortest period, and which promises to be the most efficient in the present contest. If the views of the Government were not now confined to the present war, he considered it inexpedient to build public ships. It was necessary that the revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be employed so as to carry on the war with vigor, he would not shrink from any appropriation which could tend to produce that effect; by protracting the contest for the want of means, expense will be accumulated, and we should achieve nothing.

Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the navy, with a view to reconcile other measures to the opposition – to him that vote promised no such result. Our political opponents, continued he, will tell us, as regards the navy, you are doing right to add to it; thus far we will go with you; we always maintained this to be the proper course; as to your golden dreams in Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves exclusively. Such were his present impressions; it would gratify him to find himself to have been mistaken. He declared his intention to oppose the building of 74´s, or double-decked ships, and to advocate a greater number of the largest class frigates. If, however, his statements should not prove satisfactory to the House, he declared the failure would not induce him ultimately to vote against that species of force which a majority might deem expedient.

If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying the keels of the double-decked ships, be (as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by high authority) to test the intentions of the legislature as to a permanent naval establishment, he, for one, declared, he would not thus be tested, nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor of the proposition; he would always be governed by circumstances.

The declaration of the committee, that it was proper to meet "like with like," or, in other words, because the British have seventy-four gun ships, the United States should have them of the same class, would have no effect on him. We might as well say, because there are ships in the British service, which carry one hundred and twenty guns, we should also have such. This reasoning is fallacious. No one has attempted to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting that you had four seventy-four gun ships on your navy list, he maintained, they would answer no good purpose. In the course of the following year, their number will be more than doubled and trebled on the part of the enemy. The consequence would be, that your most expensive ships must either combat under very unpromising circumstances, or they would be blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse than useless; they must be kept at a heavy expense, and their crews would deprive other ships of the men necessary for their equipment. He said, the opinions which he had just advanced were not the result of idle speculations at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent commanders, and rested upon the firm base of experience; they were confirmed by the conversations of some whose splendid achievements adorned the pages of our Revolutionary history, and by others, who rank as heroes of the present war. He asked, why need we resort to other authority, when that of the head of the Naval Department can be brought to bear testimony in favor of the propositions laid down? In the year 1798, the Secretary of the Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, "would probably be found sufficient to insure our future peace with the nations of Europe." In 1811, it was declared that, "twelve sail of seventy-fours and twenty well-constructed frigates, with our smaller vessels," were necessary to annoy the commerce of the enemy, and guard our coasts. To this he added that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace with the United States, the British had seven ships-of-the-line on the American stations, independent of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels; at the same time, they had thirty-nine ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell me, said he, what is to keep a great proportion of them from your coast in 1813?

Mr. McKee said, he had not expected this subject would have been taken up to-day, or to say any thing on it when it should be taken up. But, said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled to ask, are you going to build these vessels? Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars, in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures, to protect commerce? Will this old argument, in favor of a navy, now be used, which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir, where is your commerce now to protect? Will you protect that clandestinely destined to Great Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined to the coast of France? Let us reflect what commerce you can carry on with France. None worth protection, or of any moment to the great body of the American people. Does France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which heretofore have found a market there? She has never been a purchaser of provisions or breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between us and France? Your cotton, in France, is taxed with enormous duties. No man who is not under the influence of the moon would, at this time, think of making a shipment there. Would you ship your commerce there merely to surrender so much property into the grasp of the Emperor? It would be the extreme of folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce? To the Baltic, sir? You can carry on in that quarter no commerce at all interesting to the great body of the American people. In what does your export to that region consist? In articles of colonial produce; not in articles the produce of your soil. Will you tax the great agricultural community for the purpose of protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if the people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the Middle States, or any other portion of the American people, will be content to be taxed to support a navy for the protection of a commerce in foreign produce, by which but few individuals in the nation can be benefited? There is no commerce to protect, unless it be that which exchanges specie for the production of the East Indies, and benefits no part of the community. Having no valuable commerce now to protect, the object of adding vessels to your navy, must be to fight your battles at sea.

If you would propose a navy as a means of carrying on war, bend your resources to that object. We have been told that the trident of Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir, the sovereignty of the ocean is not to be acquired by four ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates. You can have no legitimate object in building such vessels as proposed, unless it be to carry on the war. If that be your object, make your means commensurate to the end you have in view.

Do you yet contend that the object is to protect commerce? Your commerce is not worth the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants? No, sir. They will pay only their proportion. I recollect, when a boy, to have seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures more than the reading, in which were the representations of a king, a priest, a soldier, and a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of each contained these words: The king says, "I govern all;" the priest, "I pray for all;" the soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I pay for all." This, sir, is perfectly true as regards the American farmers – they pay for all. And what advantage do they derive from it? What advantage are my constituents to derive from the expenditure of this money?