PLATO

9 Parmenides

Overview: This dialogue is one of the most difficult of all Plato’s body of work to understand. It has confused and confounded philosophy pundits for centuries. Perhaps the concepts behind it are no longer an active part of the human experience. Even Aristotle, Plato’s most famous pupil, refuted Plato’s Theory of Forms.

The dialogue, Parmenides, is presented as an account of a meeting thrice

removed. The initial meeting takes place at Pythodorous’ house. Here, Zeno reads his new book on Unity and Plurality in the presence of Parmenides, Socrates and a young man named Aristotle, who is not the philosopher we know. Rather, he is the one who later in life became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after the Peloponnesian Wars. The venerable Parmenides is sixty-five years old and Zeno, his protege, is forty years old; both are from the city of Elea. Socrates is twenty and Aristotle is younger still. The book under discussion, the “Theories of Unity and Plurality” is now lost to us. The discussion was memorized by Pythodorous, who then recited it to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato. In turn, Antiphon has memorized it and then recites it to Cephalus for the present dialogue.

In this dialogue, Parmenides rather than the usual Socrates, who is

described as young and not mature enough, is Plato’s spokesman. Here, Plato describes his Theory of Forms. Zeno has argued that, if there are many things, then all of them will be both alike (similar) and unalike (different), but such a condition is an impossible contradiction. This uncertainty disappears if one separates, on the one hand the Form of sensible things, from, on the other hand, both the Forms of alike and unalike things. So the same things can be both alike and unalike by being both in the Forms of alikeness and unalikeness. Here is a brief description of Forms: A chair is a Form but there are wooden chairs, leather chairs, metal chairs, four-legged chairs, and three-legged chairs. In one sense these types of chairs are all unalike, while in a contrary sense they still are alike, as they all are chairs, objects used to sit upon. Parmenides points out that Socrates has made the distinction between Forms and Sensibles. Socrates says that he can recognize mathematical, ethical, and aesthetic

Forms such as Unity, Plurality, Goodness, and Beauty. However he is

unsure about the Forms of Man, Fire and Water and those of objects such as hair, mud and dirt. Socrates is brushed aside by Parmenides as being too immature to understand.

The discussion continues with several arguments put forward with regards to the concept of Forms in Unity and in Plurality. For example, existence in a single Form for, Largeness or Smallness. Such categories suggest that each Form is a thought existing in a soul. If this placement is correct, then a thought must be considered as something that is a Form. The argument changes as Forms are taken to be patterns in nature. Later, Parmenides says that Forms exist only in their relationship to each other. Socrates is unable to follow all these arguments, but Parmenides brushes

him aside and blames his lack of understanding on his immaturity.

The second part of the dialogue presents Aristotle as Parmenides’ interlocutor. The two of them consider the subject, “if oneness is.” If one has no beginning, center, or end, then oneness is part of all being and vice-versa. Now, if oneness is not a separate entity then it participates in everything different from an entity. So everything is partially one.

Scholars over the years have been unable to satisfactorily characterize

this dialogue. No credible understanding is available, though the topic

of Forms as the theory of Unity was very dear to Plato.

Cephalus arrives in Athens from his home in Clazomanae, and meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus asks Cephalus if there is any thing he can do for him. Cephalus answers that the real reason he made the trip was to ask for a favor from him. They talk about Antiphon, who had met a friend of Zeno’s called Pythodorous. Pythodorous can recite from memory the discussion Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle once had, as he had heard it many times from Pythodorous and now Antiphon can also recite it from memory. Cephalus says that he would like to hear about that discussion. Adeimantus replies that this request should not be difficult to fulfill, and they all walk to nearby Antiphon’s house. After some initial hesitation Antiphon agrees to the request.

Antiphon tells them that at the time of the discussion, Parmenides was about sixty-five years old, Zeno was about forty, and Socrates was twenty. All three gathered to hear about Zeno’s book, The Theories of Unity and Plurality. They also had the namesake of Aristotle in their company, the youngest of them all; the man, who later in life, after Athens lost the war with Sparta, became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens. Parmenides was initially outside the room when Zeno started to read his book out loud but joined them later. After Zeno finished reading his book, Socrates asked him to repeat his first argument. Then he asked Zeno what he means when he says that things that are many must be both alike and unalike. Socrates states that such a classification is impossible because things that are unalike cannot be things that are like each other, nor can things that are alike be unalike. Socrates asks Zeno whether he had misunderstood his statements. Parmenides intervenes, observing that actually Zeno is saying the same thing that Socrates had previously said, only changing it around a little. Parmenides adds that Socrates, had said before, that all is one, and he gives an excellent proof for that proposition. Zeno says that this proof is not sufficient and gives several proofs of his own. Hence, Parmenides argues that with one thing being “oneness” and the other “not many,” they both in essence mean the same thing. Socrates then asks if there is a Form that is itself-byitself. A thing is itself-by-itself if it is separate from other things. If that is the case, then itself, means apart and on its own. In another sense itself-by-itself also means responsible for its own being, independent of other things. Thus, itself means because of itself and that there is one Form, itself-by-itself of likeness, with an opposite Form for what unalike is. Therefore, of the things called many they get a share of both alikeness and unalikeness. Socrates adds that it would not be astonishing if he says he is both one thing and many things at the same time: When I want to show that I am many, I point out that my right side is different from my left side and that I have upper and lower parts. On the other hand, when I want to show that I am one, I note that I am one of the seven of us now present in this room. This analysis shows that I am both one and many. Hence, both of you apparently mean practically the same thing, but it appears that what you have said is not understood by some of us.

Zeno claims that the book is in defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who make fun of it, as many absurdities result from the argument “if it is one”. Socrates tells Zeno that he accepts this point, but then asks if there is a Form itself-by-itself of alikeness, a Form that is apart on its own. Also another Form opposite to this, which is what unalike is. He further asks how what is called “many” can get a share of these entities. When Socrates finishes his question, Parmenides praises him for his understanding. Parmenides also distinguishes certain Forms being separate, which also separate the things that partake of them with alikeness itself being something separate. Parmenides asks him if there is a Form, itself-by-itself, of the Just, the Beautiful, the Good and other such things. Socrates replies in the affirmative. Then Parmenides asks about human beings and whether there is a separate Form for them or for all those others similar to them? He extends this question and asks whether there is a Form itself of Human Being, or of Fire, or of Water? Socrates replies that he doubts that such a Form exists or that he would talk about Form in this context in the same way.

Parmenides further asks about things that at first may seem absurd, such as hair, mud, or dust. Does Socrates doubt whether there are separate Forms for each of these? Socrates replies that he has no such doubts. He adds that these Forms are just as we see them, if it is not so, he avers that he might fall into a pit of nonsense. Parmenides responds that this interpretation is correct, but, because Socrates is still young, he will take notice of it when he is older and will consider nothing beneath his notice. Parmenides then asks Socrates whether he still believes that there are certain Forms that derive their names from having a share of alikeness, for example the Form of the Large by getting a share of Largeness, and the Beautiful Form by getting a share of Beauty? To this question Socrates replies in the affirmative. Parmenides adds that all characteristics are what they are in relation to the controlled and have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. It is by people partaking of these that they get their various names.

All those present are confounded by this discussion and ask Parmenides to go through the whole of his argument again, so as to explain his theories. After much hesitation Parmenides eventually agrees to do so. The group selects the youngest amongst them, Aristotle, to be his interlocutor.

Parmenides starts by declaring that, if an object is one, then one can not be many. Aristotle agrees with this hypothesis. Parmenides continues, saying that, if this is so, then there cannot be a part of the object nor can the object be whole, a conclusion that Aristotle questions. Parmenides then poses the query, if a part is a part of the whole, then what is a whole? He answers his own question. It would be something from which no part is missing. Therefore, in any case, the one thing would be composed of parts, both if it is whole and/or if it is composed of parts. Aristotle agrees with this definition. Parmenides then says that in both cases the one would be many rather than one. Aristotle also agrees with this definition. Parmenides adds that nonetheless, it must not be many but one. Therefore if one is to be one, then it can be neither whole nor have parts. If it does not have parts, then it cannot either have a beginning nor an end nor a middle, as these would be parts. Furthermore, a beginning and an end are limits, so as it can have neither, such an object would be unlimited. Therefore, it would be without shape, as it is neither round nor straight. This then also means that it would be nowhere.

In a similar manner Parmenides continues this line of argument over the supposition “if oneness is” for a considerable time. Parmenides attempts to sum up the argument by saying that “if oneness does not exist,” then things other than the one do exist. Others things will not be one and surely they will not be many unalike, since oneness would be present in things that are many. If none of these is one, he continues, they are all nothing, so they also cannot be many. If oneness is not present in others, they are neither many nor one. Neither are they one of many. They do not belong to any Form as they have no parts. So if oneness does not exist, none of the alike can be one or many, since without oneness it is impossible to conceive of many. Therefore, if oneness is not, otherness neither is, nor is conceived to be one or many. Hence they are neither alike nor unalike. To sum up, “if one does not exist, then nothing does.”

10 Philebus

Overview: Readers of this dialogue will find that they start in the middle of the discussion that Socrates is having with Philebus. As the reader enters, Philebus gives up his place in the ongoing discussion with Socrates to Protarchus. Later, when Socrates and Protarchus end the discussion, Protarchus remarks that they have not finished, and there are points he wants to discuss further at a later time. The modality where the thread of the dialogue is picked up in the middle is known as “in mediis rebus” or “in medias res.” The dialogue both begins and ends in the same fashion.

The subject of the discussion is how a human being can lead the best possible life that constitutes a good life. During this discussion, both Philebus and Protarchus choose the life of unbounded pleasure, whereas Socrates advocates a life of knowledge, reason, and intelligence. The three of them go on to discuss the nature of unity and plurality of both pleasures and knowledge. Socrates insists that there are different kinds of knowledge and different kinds of pleasures. They all agree that this plurality needs to be discussed, before they can discuss the nature of pleasure and of knowledge. They also discuss false pleasures and the comparison of freedom from pain as pleasure.

Finally, they agree that perhaps a combination of pleasure and knowledge might lead to the best chance for a happy life. Also included in their discussion is whether only pleasure or only knowledge would offer a second best choice for a happy life. They analyze this choice at considerable length, considering multiple possibilities. However, they are unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion. At this impasse Socrates suggests that they end the discussion. Protarchus refuses to stop, preferring that they continue to discuss a few more points that he has in mind. Thus, the dialogue for the reader ends in the middle of the discussion, that is the way it started. Perhaps Plato is leaving further conclusions up to the reader to think about and decide.

Though we know of no person by the name of Philebus in antiquity, the

word Philebus in Greek means young lover. Perhaps Plato is trying to

signify a life of pleasure by using this name.

In the company of a group of young men, Socrates discusses with one of them, Philebus, what constitutes a good life. In the middle of the discussion, Protarchus joins replacing Philebus. At this point Socrates sets out to inform Protarchus about the premise of their discussion. Socrates tells Protarchus that Philebus has argued that what is good for a person is to be pleased and delighted by pleasures and by whatever else goes with enjoyment. Socrates believes that knowledge, knowing, understanding, and what these traits engender are better than pleasure for both those now alive and for future generations. Protarchus agrees with Philebus and takes over further discussion of these divergent hypotheses.

Socrates comments that they will have to prove what will render life happy for all human beings. Both Philebus and Protarchus say that pleasures are what will make all humans happy, while, according to Socrates, knowledge is the key to happiness. Socrates brings up the possibility that there might be something in between pleasure and knowledge, and asks Philebus for his opinion. Philebus answers that for him pleasure always wins. Protarchus interrupts, stating that he has taken over from Philebus, and Philebus no longer has any say in the discussion. Philebus agrees and calls on the Goddess Aphrodite as the witness for his views.

Socrates says that, according to Philebus, though the Goddess is called Aphrodite her real name is Pleasure. He adds that he is always anxious about what name to use when referring to a God. He is willing to call Aphrodite by whatever name pleases her, but Pleasure is a complex title and must be considered carefully.

Socrates asks the group to consider that a debauched person gets pleasure from debauchery, while a sober minded person takes pleasure from sobriety. A fool may get pleasure from foolish opinions, whereas a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. He states that no sensible man can say that these different types of pleasures are alike. Protarchus agrees that pleasure can come from diverse and even opposite sources, but that such experiences are not contradictory to one another. How can pleasure from whatever source, not be simply unmitigated pleasure?

Socrates points out another anomaly. He says that a color is most like color. All colors are colors, but black is not only different from white but is opposite to white. In the same way different shapes are all very different. However, there is a type of unity of all things that are opposites. Likewise, some pleasures are contrary to other pleasures. Protarchus agrees with this interpretation, but he questions how it affects the argument in general? Socrates responds that the effect is present because all of these pleasures are called by different names. For example, all pleasant things are called good, but in some ways there are some good things that are bad. He then asks, if there is a common element that allows him to call all pleasures good? Protarchus does not accept that some pleasures are good while others are bad. Socrates tries to have him explain this statement by reiterating that some pleasures are unlike each other and some are opposites of each other. Protarchus maintains that this distinction does not apply in so far as they are all pleasures. Socrates concludes that this discussion has reached an unacceptable impasse. If he, for instance, says that wisdom, knowledge, and all similar things laid down at the beginning of the discussion are good, would not his answers have the same consequences as Protarchus’ arguments? Protarchus asks how this could be so? Socrates answers that branches of knowledge seem to be a plurality, but then some branches turn out to be opposites. Socrates notes that if he were to deny such a distinction, the whole discussion would be an absurdity. Protarchus agrees that they can not let such a contradiction occur. He also agrees that there are many different types of both pleasures and knowledge. In this fashion they hold a lengthy discussion of the knowledge of letters, numbers and music. They include a discussion of the metaphysics of unity and plurality and of sameness and opposites. Protarchus suggests that Socrates has plunged them into a considerable problem by leading them around in circles. Socrates seems to be asserting that there are different kinds of pleasures. Furthermore, Socrates has not elucidated how many or what sort of pleasures do exist and that there are, he claims, similar sets of questions about knowledge. All present would like to have Socrates complete the discussion. Socrates says that he suddenly remembers something from the past. He had a dream that neither pleasure nor knowledge leads to the good life, but that there is a third concept that is different from and superior to both. If this is so, and the three people involved in the discussion consider that pleasure is not good, then pleasure is no longer the victor. Thus they will not have to consider different kinds of pleasures. Protarchus urges them to continue this discussion. Socrates says that they must first decide whether good is perfect or imperfect and whether it is sufficient for the good life. Socrates suggests that to resolve the question, they should put “a life of pleasure” and “a life of knowledge” on trial and reach a verdict by looking at each of them separately. Protarchus is confused about how to conduct such a trial. Socrates suggests that there is either no knowledge in the life of pleasure or no pleasure in the life of knowledge. Therefore, if either one provides for a good life, nothing additional will be necessary. Both discussants agree with this conclusion.

Socrates continues by asking Protarchus if he would find it acceptable to live his whole life in enjoyment of pleasures? Protarchus replies with a definite affirmative. Socrates asks again if Protarchus would have any need for knowledge? Protarchus replies that if he has pleasure, he has all he needs. But then Socrates points out that, if he has no knowledge, memory, or reason, how can he know whether he is happy when he is devoid of all intelligence? Socrates continues in this same direction. He points out that with a lack of memory he would never remember that he had enjoyed himself or that he had pleasure. Likewise, by not possessing judgment he would not realize that he was enjoying himself. Furthermore, being unable to calculate, he would not be able to figure out future pleasures. In the end, lacking such characteristics would be like leading the life of a mollusk that lives in the sea. Finally, Socrates asks again whether such a life is worth choosing? Protarchus admits that after hearing these arguments he is left speechless. Socrates now poses a deeper question. Suppose a person chooses a life that is in possession of every kind of knowledge, reason, memory, intelligence, and all similar concepts, but is without pleasure or pain? Protarchus replies that neither of these two offered states seems to be a worthy choice. Socrates asks whether a combination of both would be preferable? Protarchus agrees that this possibility does seem to be a worthy choice. Socrates admits that this turn of events has upended their whole discussion. Protarchus agrees that of the three choices of life offered so far, two of them – namely either a life of pleasure only or a life of knowledge and reason only, are not worthy of or sufficient for man.

Thus, having decided that the first choice for a good life should go to the combination of knowledge and pleasure. They then address the matter of which of the two choices with which they started should get second place. Socrates proposes that knowledge be given this position, whereas Protarchus proposes that pleasure should be the choice. As they have failed to agree on this ordering, Socrates suggests that they should restart the discussion with a new starting point. Protarchus asks for a clarification of this suggestion. Socrates responds that everything that exists can be divided into two categories: limited and unlimited. In this fashion, Socrates continues the divisions and subdivisions, but after considerable effort he fails to reach any agreement with Protarchus.

Socrates then suggests yet another approach. He states that they did agree that a life that combines knowledge with pleasure is to be preferred. Therefore they should look to see what life is. Protarchus agrees with this notion that the choice of life be assigned to a third category, the other two categories being life of pleasure and life of knowledge. He points out that life is just not a mixture of pleasure and knowledge, but also includes the idea that all that is unlimited is also tied down by limits.

Socrates asks, whether pleasure and pain have limits? Philebus replies that pleasure has no limit, it is so good that by nature it is boundless. Socrates continues this line of questioning by asking in which category the qualities of knowledge, reason and intelligence should be? Socrates and Protarchus agree that neither reason nor pleasure has beginning, middle, or end.

The discussion continues and turns to what causes pain and how the relief of pain leads to pleasure. Socrates says that it seems that pleasure and pain arise together. He observes that by continuing this discussion, they wou