PLATO

At this point Socrates suggests that they take up a different line of inquiry. Instead of knowing and not knowing, he proposes that perhaps they should move to being and not being. Theaetetus asks for further clarification of this distinction. Socrates says that when a man judges things that are not there, then he is judging falsely. As an example, a man sees something, yet sees nothing. Theaetetus questions the meaning of that statement. Socrates answers that a man who is seeing anything is seeing something that is. Theaetetus agrees. Socrates goes through similar examples of hearing, touching, etcetera and concludes that a man who is judging one thing is judging something that is, therefore, he is not judging nothing. However, a man who is judging nothing is not judging anything at all. Therefore, it is not possible to judge what is not, either about a thing that is or is just by itself. Hence, false judgment is something different from judging things that are not. Socrates adds that there is false judgment when, in place of one of the things that is, the person substitutes his thoughts with another thing that is, and then asserts that substitution by his own thoughts is correct. In this way that man is always judging something that is, but really he is judging one thing in place of the other. Hence, having missed the thing that was the object of his observation he can be seen to be one who judges falsely. Theaetetus verbalizes Socrates’ argument that when a man judges “ugly” instead of “beautiful” or the other way around, he is truly judging what is false. Socrates asks if he approves the suggestion that false judgment is “other judging” and asks if it is possible to have in one’s thoughts the other thing and not the thing itself. Theaetetus answers positively, so Socrates asks whether a man should be thinking of one or of both of these things? Theaetetus replies that it is essential to consider either both things together or each in turn. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he agrees that his idea of what thinking is, is the same as his own? Theaetetus requests some clarity here. Socrates says that he believes that when a soul thinks, it asks itself questions and then answers them. This question-and-answer affirms a desire, and that is called judgment. Thus, to judge is to make a statement that is addressed to oneself. When a man judge’s one thing to be another, he is telling himself that one thing is the other. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he has ever tried to persuade himself that one thing is another thing: something like “a cow must be a horse.” Theaetetus replies in the negative. No one judges ugly to be beautiful, when someone has both things in his mind as he judges. He cannot possibly say that one is the other. Socrates says that he realizes that false judgment occurs, not in relation to a perception or thought of one thing in relation to another, but in the connecting of perception and thought. Socrates suggests that false judgment is other than misapplication of thought to perception, but that, too, is a problem. At this stage of their discussion, there is either no such thing as false judgment or a man may not know what he knows. Socrates notes that this conclusion shows that those who do not know what knowledge is, should not make pronouncements about what knowing is.

Socrates offers further examples. How can people say: “we are acquainted with” or “we are not acquainted with,” “we know,” or “we do not know,” if they are still ignorant of what knowledge is? When people say that they know something, it means that they have the knowledge of it. Socrates says that he would like to change this declaration to: “possession of knowledge.” Theaetetus questions how these two statements are different? Socrates explains that to possess is not the same as to have. He adduces the example of a man who buys a coat but is not wearing it. In that case it can be said that he possesses the coat but does not have it with him at that time. The same concept applies to knowledge. To possess knowledge is one thing, but to have knowledge is another thing. It is impossible for anyone not to possess something that he has possession of. In the same manner he cannot not fail to know something that he knows. Nonetheless, he can still make a false judgment about that knowledge because he may not have the proper knowledge of it. Socrates concludes that it is therefore impossible for a person not to know what he knows, the same way that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses. Therefore, false judgment is merely a matter of interchange of pieces of knowledge. Socrates gives another example. Suppose a jury has been persuaded on some matter that only an eye witness could have known. Then the jury comes to a decision on hearsay evidence, forming a true judgment. Albeit that the jury has decided without knowledge even though they were persuaded to come to a correct decision and did their job well. However, if true judgment is the same as knowledge, then the jury could not claim to have done well. Even the best juryman cannot form a correct judgment without knowledge. So Socrates concludes that true judgment and knowledge must be different. Once again the discussants are left at an impasse.

Theaetetus says that he once heard someone say that knowledge is true judgment with an account, while judgment without an account is not knowledge. Socrates replies that the problem is how to distinguish between the knowable and the unknowable. He begins to describe a dream he had. In his dream he heard that the primary elements from which everything in the world is composed have no account. It is not possible to say anything else about these elements except their names but, when things are composed of primary elements they become complexes of names. Therefore the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceived just the same. However, the complexes are both knowable and expressible and therefore can be objects of true judgment. Theaetetus agrees that this distinction was just what he had heard. Socrates now asks Theaetetus if he agrees with the statement that knowledge is true judgment with an account. To this question Theaetetus replies in the affirmative. Socrates responds that he is surprised that they have found an answer to what wise men have been seeking for years and adds that there is one point with which he does not agree. It is that the elements are unknowable but the complexes are knowable. He continues, pointing out that when these statements were made, they were used as models, letters, elements language and syllables i.e., complexes. Socrates and Theaetetus then decide to examine this point. First, Socrates confirms that they have agreed that they can give an account of the syllables but not the letters, Theaetetus concurs. Next, Socrates asks what the first syllable of his name is. Theaetetus replies SO. Socrates asks what SO is? Theaetetus replies S and O. So that is an account of a syllable. Socrates then asks for an account of the letter S. Theaetetus replies that such an account is not possible, as it is merely a letter and hence unaccountable. Socrates says that they have proved the point that a syllable is knowable but not a letter. Now Socrates asks what people mean when they speak of a syllable. If a person knows the first two letters of his name then he must know both of the letters. The person can not be ignorant of each letter and yet know the two of them without knowing either. This restriction then proves that their initial theory was wrong. Socrates suggests an alternative condition. He proposes that a complex be considered as a single form resulting from a combination of several elements or things. Thus a complex cannot have parts, otherwise the whole thing will be different from the sum of its parts. Socrates comes up with another example, this time the number six. Five plus one, two plus four, two times three, they all equal six. Then he asks whether speaking of six means speaking of it as a sum of all these numbers. In that case there is no difference between a sum and part of a whole number. This means that the result of their initial discussion concerning letters and syllables was wrong. The two of them conclude that anyone who says that something that is a complex and that can be known and expressed, but has unknown elements is therefore wrong. Socrates now wants to go back to the original question as to what the addition of an account to true judgment means? He suggests that there are three possibilities for what is meant by account. The first would be expressing someone’s thoughts. Here, a man expresses the image of his judgment. Theaetetus agrees, but then Socrates says that anyone who makes a correct judgment will turn out to have combined it together with its account. Hence, correct judgment without knowledge will not be found anywhere. The second possibility is that an account means that a man has knowledge of a thing when he believes that same thing to be part of one thing or part of something else, or when he judges that one thing or some thing different that belongs to the same object. Socrates gives the example, that when a student is learning to write and is asked to spell Theaetetus’ name, the student thinks and then begins to write THE. When asked to write Theodorus’ name, he thinks and then starts with TE. If this is the case, Socrates asks, can it be said that the student knows the first syllable of Theaetetus’ name? Theaetetus answers that anyone at that age does not have the knowledge of spelling the name correctly. So this young person is writing with correct judgment but without knowledge. Hence, the person is writing while possessing an account along with correct judgment. This dichotomy is an instance of correct judgment with an account that cannot be called knowledge. Such a conclusion brings Socrates to his third possibility. A person could be able to mark an object with the characteristic by which it differs from all other similar objects. Theaetetus asks for an example of this condition. Socrates offers the sun as such an example, and asks whether Theaetetus would be satisfied if he were to say it is the brightest body that moves about the earth and the heavens. The point is that, if someone can get at a difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then that contrast provides an account of that thing. Socrates gives another example of someone looking at a shadow painting. Anyone close up to the painting cannot take it all in with a single view, but if the observer stands back, the picture will appear to have some meaning. Putting it another way, Socrates proffers the theoretical situation in which he forms a correct judgment about Theaetetus if he can also grasp Theaetetus’ account, then he can say that he knows Theaetetus. If he cannot understand Theaetetus’ account, then he is merely judging a young man. An account is a matter of showing differences. So Socrates would have to know some features that belong to Theaetetus only, such as the shape of his nose. For someone to say that it is Theaetetus who is before him, he must know these definite features about him to make such judgment. Thus, correct judgment is also concerned with differences in what the judgment is about. This type of reasoning goes round in circles because the answer to the question of “what knowledge is” is “correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of differences.”

Socrates says that, in the final analysis, knowledge is not perception, nor is it true judgment, nor an account added to judgment. What knowledge is remains an unresolved question. Socrates advises Theaetetus that he will be a better person as a result of this inquiry, but he must be modest and not think that he knows what he does not know. Socrates admits that he does not know any of the things that other men claim to know. In utter frustration Socrates concludes that all they have produced is “wind-eggs.” After this discussion he takes leave of Theaetetus to go to court to hear the indictment that Meletus has brought against him.

7 Sophist

Overview: The question raised in this Dialogue is: “What does the title of Sophist imply?” The word sophist is derived from Sophia, which means wise in Greek. Therefore, a sophist is one who teaches wisdom. This is one of the few Dialogues where Socrates does not play a major role. Socrates is present at the start when the dialogue is arranged between a man known as the Visitor from Elea, and Theaetetus. Elea is a Greek city in Southern Italy that is the stronghold of the sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. It would appear that by not giving Socrates a major role – Plato’s spokesman in other dialogues – Plato is down-playing the sophist Parmenides who claims to teach virtue. Plato consistently maintains that virtue cannot be taught; it is learned by experience. Though the sophists claim the high ground of teaching virtue, all they are doing is teaching how to debate. A sophist is a juggler of words and a very good imitator of someone who claims to be all-knowing. He may be an expert in one thing, but he claims to be an expert in everything. He projects cleverness but he is a cheat and knows how to flatter his rich young students with a play of words; his only goal is collecting fees.

Theodorus, Socrates, and Theaetetus meet together as previously planned. Theodorus informs them that he has brought along a visitor from Elea, a Greek city in Southern Italy. This man is a member of a group of philosophers that gathers around the great sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. Socrates inquires what title the Visitor uses, for example Sophist, Statesman or Philosopher. Theodorus replies with a question as to what makes him ask this question. Socrates replies that he wonders whether the Visitor thought that all these titles were considered to be the same or different? Theodorus suggests that perhaps the Visitor can answer that question himself. The Visitor replies that he would be glad to explain. Socrates asks if he would like to explain with a long speech or use the question-and-answer format as Parmenides does. The Visitor selects the latter. Socrates suggests that Theaetetus will be able to answer the questions and thus it is settled with the two of them, namely the Visitor and Theaetetus, holding the discussion. They first plan to obtain a clear account of what a Sophist is. The Visitor adds that it is not easy to describe what a Sophist is. Instead, he would like to start with a simple example and then advance further. Both agree to this mode of examination. The Visitor suggests that they start with a simple subject, such as an angler. The Visitor divides every answer into two parts. He asks whether they should call the angler an expert or a non-expert. Theaetetus says that he is obviously not a non-expert. The Visitor replies that expertise also falls into two categories. One kind would be an expertise in producing things such as farming and construction, while the other type relates to learning while not creating anything, such as commerce or hunting. The former takes things that have come into being, which is known as acquisition. So possession is either through production or acquisition. Therefore, he asks, which mode the angler employs. Theaetetus replies acquisition. The Visitor replies there are two types of expertise in acquisition. One type is a willing exchange through gift or purchase, while the other will be acquired by actions or words. The Visitor further divides possession into two categories; one done openly as by combat, the other done secretly as by hunting. He further divides hunting into two parts, hunting living things or lifeless things. Thus, the Visitor divides all the answers into two, constructing and deconstructing.

The Visitor suggests that they use this model to understand what makes a sophist. He asks whether the sophist is an expert. Theaetetus asserts that as the name sophist suggests being wise, it implies some type of expertise. So both the angler and the sophist have knowledge. The Visitor suggests that both the sophist and the angler appear to be hunters. After multiple such deductions, the Visitor claims that the sophist will be classified as a wage-earner. He is agreeable to people and earns wages by what could be called flattery. When this kind of wage earning teaches virtue to people, the teacher could be called a sophist: a person who deals with knowledge, its acquisition, and sale. A sophist has expertise in debating and appears in many different forms. Examples include a hunter hired by a group of rich young men, a wholesaler and a retailer of learning about the soul, a seller of his own learning, and an expert in verbal combat called debating. The sophist cleanses souls of beliefs that interfere with learning. No one can know everything, but sophists know about things that they dispute. To their students they appear to be wise about everything, without actually being wise. So the sophist has belief and knowledge about everything but does not possess truth. Thus, he must be regarded as a cheat and an imitator.

The Visitor continues, saying that a sophist is deceptive about appearances and so is an expert at deception. He is an expert at cheating and telling falsehoods. The sophist can make young people believe that they are wiser than everyone else. The sophist says this because if they did not look wise, then no one would be willing to pay to listen to their wisdom. If a person is expert in only one thing, but promises to make everything clear, then he is trying to fool everyone. Thus, he is one of those people who play games. He is a cheat and an imitator. At this point the Visitor divides the sophist’s actions into two parts, likeness-making and appearance-making, a difficult distinction. Examples of this distinction include appearing and seeming but not being, saying things but not true things, and uttering these things without being caught up in verbal combat. The Visitor then asks Theaetetus how a person would employ the words: “that which is not.” Theaetetus finds the question confusing. The Visitor replies that it is obvious that: “that which is not” cannot be applied to that: “which is”. He further says that this terminology cannot be applied to “that which” and thus it will not be right to apply it to: “something.” This “something” is always applied to a being, so a person saying something must be saying the same one thing. Someone who does not say something is not saying anything at all. Such a person speaks but says nothing. The Visitor then goes into a long exposition delving into the concepts of: “that which is not and those which are and also of being and not being”.

In the end, all those present conclude that a sophist only imitates the production of contrary speech. He is insincere and unknowing. He is a juggler of words. He is human and not divine, earning a living by clever debating.

8 Statesman

Overview: This dialogue follows the one called Sophist. The whole dialogue, if it can be called a dialogue, is dominated by the Visitor from Elea. As in the Sophist Dialogue the Visitor remains unnamed. In those times, Parmenides was the principle sophist in the City of Elea and it appears that Plato did not always agree with him. The interlocutor, called young Socrates, is very much like the student Theaetetus in the Sophist dialogue. He always agrees with the visitor and never once asks an intelligent question.

A statesman is a person who, by virtue of his knowledge, governs the City-State. Statesmanship requires knowledge to govern wisely, but none of the three modes of government prevalent at that time namely: kingship, aristocracy, or democracy, brings out the true statesman. None of the city rulers of Greece at that time possessed that quality. The best that citizens could hope for was a government based on a set of written rules, e.g., a constitution. When such rules are disregarded, as they often were in those times, then the government becomes a tyranny.

The discussants in this dialogue start with the original intention of finding out what specific knowledge a sophist, statesman or philosopher has. It is interesting that Plato never wrote the third dialogue about what defines a philosopher and so the question remains open, why he did not do so? It may be that he left it as a challenge for the reader to decide what qualities are required to be a philosopher.

Socrates, Theodorus and the visitor from Elea meet again to continue their discussion of what is implied by the titles Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher. Along with them are young Theaetetus and the young Socrates, a namesake of the elder. Having completed their discussion regarding sophists, they consider what they should discuss next. They leave the choice to the Visitor, who chooses to discuss the statesman. The Visitor suggests that they should let Theaetetus rest this time and have young Socrates answer the questions. Everyone in the group agrees.

The Visitor begins by asking if they should consider the statesman to be someone possessing knowledge or whether they should start with a different assumption. Young Socrates proposes that considering a statesman as someone possessing knowledge is a good starting place for their discussion. The Visitor suggests that they should consider different sorts of knowledge as they had done when discussing the sophist.

The Visitor starts by claiming that arithmetic is a type of expert knowledge. It does not involve practical action but only provides knowledge. Skills such as carpentry involve an expert knowledge, but they also require a practical knowledge in the creation of objects. Based on this condition, the Visitor suggests that they divide knowledge into two classes, theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. Young Socrates agrees that these two divisions are parts of the single concept of knowledge. The Visitor asks if it is appropriate to say that the statesman and the king on the one hand and the slave-master and the household manager on the other are also one thing. Young Socrates questions why the Visitor makes this division. The Visitor asks that if a person who is in private practice advises a doctor who is in public employment, should both be called by the same professional title? Young Socrates believes that this would be proper. The Visitor proceeds to ask that if this is so, then someone who is himself a private citizen, but is clever enough to advise the king, (although the king should have had that knowledge by virtue of his position), then is that person who passes that knowledge, whether private citizen or king, an expert on kingship? Once again young Socrates concurs. The Visitor then adds that, similarly, the household manager and the slave-master are the same thing. Likewise, there should be no difference between the ruler of a large household and the ruler of a city. Once again young Socrates agrees. The Visitor then summarizes that there is only one sort of expert knowledge, whether it is knowledge of kingship, or of statesmanship, or of household management.

For the king to maintain power, does not require the use of his hands or body, only the use of his mental powers. A king’s powers, thus, are more aligned with theoretical knowledge than with practical knowledge. The statesman, too, will fall into the same category, namely as a possessor of theoretical knowledge. The Visitor now wants to discuss what theoretical knowledge is. He reminds his listeners that they have already agreed that there is such a thing as calculations, to which young Socrates also agrees. The visitor then adds that such calculations would be part of a theoretical type of expertise. Once one recognizes the differences among the various numbers, there is not much left to do with or discuss about them. Master builders do not function as workers but rather they manage other workers. A master builder provides the understanding but not the labor, and therefore possesses theoretical knowledge. The Visitor categorizes two types of knowledge, one that makes judgments and one that serves to direct others in their activities. The Visitor asks whether kingship would fall in the category of making judgments or in that of directing others. Young Socrates chooses the later. Now the Visitor wants to examine the concept of directing others, which he further divides into two categories. He gives as an example, a retail dealer who sells goods manufactured by others and a dealer who sells self-produced goods. A king, he claims falls into the class of those who sell self-produced goods.

The Visitor continues, giving several examples that divide all new answers into two subdivisions. He also wants to consider the two aspects of a person who cares for humans, whether doing so is enforced or voluntary. If such service is enforced, it would be the result of tyranny, while if it is voluntary it would more likely be the result of statesmanship. The Visitor notes, and young Socrates agrees, that it is a universal experience that not recognizing something makes it appear to be strange. The greatest magician of all, the sophist, who plays with words, is the most versed in this art.

The Visitor says that monarchy is one variety of knowledge that rules the cities. Young Socrates agrees. They then discuss a variety of governmental knowledge that arises in situation in which power is held by a few wealthy people. This type of governance is an aristocracy. Finally a third type of knowledge, the exercise of power by the masses via a ballot, called democracy. Monarchy may be tyrannical or benevolent. Power which is held by a small group of wealthy men may be an aristocracy or an oligarchy. Democracy managed by the masses may be by force or general consent. These are the three modes of ruling. As was discussed previously, kingly rule is based on some sort of expert knowledge and not on power, wealth or general consent. The Visitor asserts that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expert knowledge. Thus, he notes, if some sort of kingly expert knowledge does exist, then for example a collection of people such as the wealthy, or all of the common people acting together, can acquire expert knowledge or statesmanship. One man with expert knowledge, ruling alone, must never do anything contrary to the written laws. If the rich follow this principle, then the state is called an aristocracy, while if they take no notice of the law the state will be called an oligarchy. When one person rules according to the laws, he imitates a person with expert knowledge and we call him king. When that ruler does not act according to the laws he is called a tyrant. The Visitor then presents another suggestion. If everything were performed on the basis of the written laws, and not on various sorts of expert knowledge, then the person selected to enforce and follow those laws rules accordingly. If that ruler were to ignore these precepts he would commit a great mistake and injustice. The person who possesses the art of statesmanship may do many things without taking notice of the written law, based on the concept that it is better for those who are ruled to be doing what a true expert on the laws should do. Thus if such kingly expert knowledge does exist, then neither the collection of rich people nor the masses will ever acquire such knowledge. Only the one person who possesses the expert knowledge will be called king.

The Visitor asks which combination of traits will be the best for the people. He presents the three possibilities again: rule by monarchy, rule by a collection of wealthy people, or rule by a collection of the masses. The Visitor again goes through his process of dividing every thing into two classes. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the one who possesses the art of kingship, is a statesman and lives by the written laws. However, it is not easy to find such a person. In other words, it is difficult to find a statesman.