The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume 30 of 55

Point first

As for the first decree, which is so general as to include all, for treating of the commerce of the islands, which is essential to their preservation: this point, which in the memorial that I have cited is argued at length, can be reduced to an argument of three infallible propositions, of which, when two are proved, the third cannot be denied; and they are in this form.

The Philipinas Islands are absolutely necessary: first, to increase the preaching of the gospel; second, to maintain the authority, grandeur, and reputation of this crown; third, to defend the Moluco Islands and their trade; fourth, to support Eastern India; fifth, to relieve the Western Indias from their enemies; sixth, to aid the two crowns of Castilla and Portugal² in breaking down the power of the Dutch; seventh, to protect for both crowns the commerce of China. In order to support the islands, the commerce with Nueva España is requisite and necessary; for by no other means can their defense, or means for supporting it, be provided. It immediately follows that it is also requisite and necessary to grant this commerce to the islands, or, by abandoning them, to lose all the advantages which result from their preservation, as here represented.

The first proposition of this argument consists of eight fundamental reasons, which are stated therein; but it seems as if they ought to be proved, in order that their force and cogency may be fully understood. Accordingly, I will run through them as briefly as possible.

The first one is the increase of the preaching and promulgation of the holy gospel. This was the principal object which the Catholic sovereigns of Castilla had in carrying on the discovery of the Western Indias, and in colonizing and supporting them – and, consequently, in doing the same for all the islands adjacent to them, among the number of which are the Philipinas; and although the richness of those provinces greatly aided their efforts, this was a secondary object with the sovereigns, and a fulfilment of what is promised in the gospel, that we must seek first the kingdom of God, and that all the rest which the world possesses and esteems shall be gathered and added to us. Therefore, since their intention was the conversion of all the infidels who inhabit that opposite hemisphere, He who became flesh in order to redeem them chose that this undertaking should gain, as a secondary result, the infinite riches which the Indias have given and are giving to España. Such a reason is not lacking in the Philipinas Islands. Their first discovery and settlement were solely for extending the Catholic faith; for then it was not known that those islands would be rich – as indeed they are not of themselves – nor that there could be any further result than the conversion of their natives to the gospel law, and the opening of a gate by which the preaching of the gospel could be carried to other provinces and kingdoms of Asia. That enterprise was prosecuted very successfully, as is publicly known; and it is now very evident that all those islands are today in the bosom of the Church – for they contain an archbishopric and three episcopal sees, and very many convents and hospitals; and there may be seen the Christian religion as pure, as valued, and as venerated as it is in España. And this rouses all the more admiration because the location of the colony is so remote, and so surrounded by heathens, Moors, and heretics; and that, in spite of all, the power and revenues of this crown are able to maintain it. But for this result, which was the main one, what was the second, and in what was seen fulfilled the promise of the gospel? It was, that God has placed in those seas a firm column, on which He could found, and by which they could support themselves, Eastern India, the Molucas Islands, their commerce, and that of China; and which shall prove for the enemies of this crown – heretics, Moors, and heathens – a check upon their advance, a resistance to their intentions, and a strong rock on which they shall be broken, or at least their success may be checked and their machinations prevented. Such are the Philipinas Islands, and this rank they acquired after the preaching of the gospel entered them; and it seems as if it were a providence of Heaven to make them so necessary from the human standpoint, in order that the divine influences might not be lacking in them. For if sometimes the attainment of the first result might not be sufficient for maintaining them (which the piety of the kings of Castilla renders incredible), that of the second result would suffice, because even the divine needs to be maintained in the world by human protection. This is an axiom which, in lands newly converted, is generally accepted in the Indias; and it has been thoroughly proved by experience that the gospel is more effective among the barbarians when it is under the royal banners and standards than when it goes without them. Accordingly, it pleased God to ordain that these standards should be necessary in the Philipinas, in order that the preaching of the gospel, which was the motive for their going thither, might be established in their shelter. It is therefore established by a well-grounded proposition that, even if no more is looked for than this aim of converting the heathen, it is now impossible to give up the preservation of the Philipinas, as being so important a part of the Catholic church. And if the kings of Castilla, in order not to permit liberty of conscience in Flandes, have during more than seventy years maintained in those states (and, through them, in all Europa) the most tedious and costly war that any monarchy in the world has waged: how can it be denied that by abandoning so vast a number of Catholics as there are in those islands, who have been instructed by the Christian zeal of Spaniards, there will, if we leave them now, be introduced among them liberty of conscience? not to mention a mingling of schismatic heretics, Moors, Jews, and heathens of various sects, as is seen in Bantan (which is the Oriental Ginebra [i. e., Geneva]), and in all other places where the Dutch find entrance; and they would soon enter those islands [if we abandon them]. Even if they caused great expenses to this crown (which they do not), they ought to be supported and preserved.

The second reason is, that in these islands are involved the authority, grandeur, and reputation of this crown. [My statement in regard to] the authority is proved by various methods, which may be found in the memorial that I have cited – of which I will only notice here the power which is exercised by the governor who rules the islands in the name of his Majesty. So great is this that it may be affirmed with truth that in all his kingdoms and seigniories (although the viceroyalties are classed as superior to that government) the king does not appoint to an office of greater authority. If this is not evident, let it be noticed how many crowned kings render homage to that governor, and recognize him as their superior; how they respect him and fear his arms; how they desire his friendship, and, if they violate it, receive punishment. The king of Ternate died a prisoner in Manila; and he of Sian made, by force of arms, satisfaction for a reprisal which he had committed. Those of Siao and Tidore are our subjects, and that of Camboxa is our ally. The ruler of Great China is our friend, and the emperor of Japòn was such until the Dutch alienated him; and although the failure of the Japanese trade causes us loss, we have not feared to declare that ruler our enemy – as are those of Champa, Sian, and Mindanao; and, more than all, the Dutch, who keep those seas so infested. And it ought to be considered that the governor of Philipinas sends ambassadors to all those kings, with gifts to present to them, and receives those that they send to him in return; he makes peace and declares war, and does whatever seems to him expedient; and all this on his own responsibility, without waiting for a decision of the matter from España, because the excessive distance renders him the entire master in these acts. This is a preëminence of so great authority that no governor or viceroy in Europe exercises it. The grandeur which this monarchy preserves in those islands is widely known. In its material aspect, that domain extends through a circuit of 1,400 leguas, in which are included the two archipelagos of San Lazaro and Moluco: the latter composed of five especially important islands, which their own kings govern, with more than seventy others adjacent; the latter, of those which are properly called Philipinas, forty in number – some of them larger than all España, some as large as this country, and others somewhat smaller. This does not mention the islands that are small and uninhabited, which are without number. Among all these is [foremost] the island of Luzon, in which is the distinguished and ever loyal city of Manila, which is the precious stone of this setting, and which alone is enough to prove the grandeur of España – by its location, its splendor, its buildings, its sky, and its soil. In its citizens are resplendent the religious faith, the loyalty, and the courage which gave origin to that colony. Since Manila is, as some say, the antipodes of Sevilla, it seems as if it tried to imitate that city in its characteristics, and in being a military center and an emporium of commerce for that hemisphere. If one considers higher things, the power of the islands cannot be reduced to the region just mentioned. Manila may be compared to the city of Goa, the capital of Eastern India; and it is she who reduces to subjection all the coasts from the Straits of Sincapura to Japòn, and the islands of the Ladrones and the Papuas; for her fleets sail through all those seas with the never conquered and always victorious royal standards of España. Her ships are admitted into many maritime kingdoms of Asia, and into numberless islands adjacent to them; they make voyages so long that no others equal to these are known. They go to China and Japòn, and by the Southern Sea to Nueva España; and by way of the Northern Sea – coasting all the Oriental kingdoms, emerging [from the China Sea] through Sincapura, and doubling the great Stormy Cape, that of Buena Esperanza – they have reached the bar of San Lucar, with these two voyages making almost the entire circuit of the world. And if commerce is regarded as the greatest splendor of kingdoms (as it certainly is), this greatness is not lacking to the Philipinas; for they have so rich a commerce that, if they could enjoy it free, there is no city known to the world that would surpass, or even equal, Manila. That in that colony resides and is preserved the reputation of this crown, is evident, if it be noted that the maintenance of that reputation by the arms of España in Fuente-Rabia, in Salsas, in Italia, in Flandes, in Alemania, and in other parts of Europa is not to be wondered at; for if España is the heart which inspires strength in the mystical body of this monarchy, it is not much that the members which are nearest and so closely connected should share most effectively in this influx of energy. And if his Majesty (whom God preserve!) is the soul or vital breath of this heart, it cannot be denied that the closer proximity will cause the greater effect. Besides, the great number of the troops who go out from the adjoining [European] states prevents the enemy from seizing any one of those states; but the greatest cause of reputation for this crown is that, at a distance of three thousand leguas from the royal person and España, three thousand three hundred and thirty-six Spaniards, all of them occupied in those islands in war and in peace, on sea and on land, [accomplish what they do]. It is the citizens of Manila who are the substance of that diamond, where the adjoining states are all enemies – barbarians, heretics, Moors, and heathens. Those Spaniards are without hope of succor in emergencies, without safety for the unfortunate in the retreat, and even without the reward due them for their achievements; they are always inferior in numbers, and continually attacked by Dutch, Mindanaos, Japanese, Jaos, and other peoples. They are always in anxiety about the Chinese, or Sangleys, who number more than 30,000 in Manila; and about the natives, of whom there are more than 80,000. In that land of many islands they maintain fortified posts, and on the sea armed fleets of galleons, galleys, and champans – one for the defense of Manila, another for conveying troops and supplies to Terrenate, and another for the fort on the island of Hermosa. In this last island and in those of Moluco, our military posts confront the Dutch; our people are continually fighting on sea and on land, while they wage on the frontier a fierce war with the most wary people that is known, and with tribes who are as cruel as they can be. Yet, although their soldiers are so few, they meet innumerable obligations, acquit themselves of all, and cause the Spanish name to emerge from all gloriously, and the standards of the king our lord victoriously. Therefore, it is the Philipinas Islands that preserve the reputation of this crown with the most valor and the least reward, with the greatest hazard, and with most glory.

The third fundamental reason is, that the Philipinas defend the islands of Moluco, and the commerce in the cloves that are obtained from them. The importance of these islands is everywhere known, because in all the world there are no other islands nor any other region in which grows this spice or drug, so highly valued. For their discovery alone Hernando de Magallanes made, by order of the emperor Carlos Fifth, that celebrated voyage in which he found the strait to which he gave his name, and passed through it into the Southern Sea; and, although he was slain while making his claims, his ship sailed around the world. The lordship of those islands caused troublesome hostilities between the Castilians and Portuguese, which were ended by this crown giving them to that of Portugal, in fulfilment of a contract; for it seemed (and indeed was evident) that Castilla would have much difficulty in maintaining them when they were so separated from all its kingdoms and states, while Portugal, by possessing Eastern India, was less distant from and could better support them. The course of time showed that even India was very remote from them; for when the Dutch power entered the Orient and established a military post in Bantan³– a port nearer to Moluco, and more advantageously located than was India – it was so obviously impossible to defend them that in the end they were lost to us, the enemy getting possession of them all and of their commerce. But as the Philipinas were by that time quite populous, and so near to the Molucas that they were superior to Bantan [as a trading post], the task of restoring the Molucas [to Spanish control] was laid upon the governor, Don Diego de Acuña – who with his courage and energy, and the convenience of being so near, regained them and restored them to this crown. When both Castilla and Portugal recognized the great expense that India would have to incur in maintaining the Molucas, and that even with excessive expenditures it would be impossible to do so, on account of the injury being nearer than the remedy, and the enemy than the succor, those islands were, by the mutual agreement of the two crowns, united to the government of the Philipinas as regards their defense and support. The clove-trade was left to the Portuguese, because it was so important that, if it were taken from them, India would perish, or become greatly weakened. It is thus sufficiently proved that the Philipinas contributed to the restoration of all the forts in the Orient; and that in their preservation was and still is involved that of the Molucas, and consequently of all India. Thus they have been maintained since the year 1603, defending them by force of arms against the Dutch, who never cease their endeavors to expel the Castilians from those islands; this has been the cause of many naval encounters and battles, in which the arms of España have always remained victorious. Nevertheless, since the military force of Philipinas is small, the territory that they must defend large, and the aid which is given to them for this purpose very limited, it has not been possible to prevent the treachery and persistence of the Dutch from having some effect; nor to put a stop to their sharing in the clove trade at some forts which they keep in the Molucas, though at the cost of many men, armed vessels, and expenses. From all of these islands are produced each year 2,816,000 libras of cloves, of which the Dutch secure 1,098,000 libras, and the Portuguese and Castilians 1,718,000 – and this latter supply is due to the protection of the Philipinas; while it is computed that the cloves which the Dutch carry away amount to three times as much as it will cost them to be absolute lords of the Molucas, even with the large garrisons and armed fleets which they keep and maintain for purchasing the spice and transporting it to Bantan. From this it obviously follows that without the Philipinas the Molucas would be lost, and their commerce and trade in cloves would cease – from which would follow two pernicious results, which would cause the loss of whatever his Majesty possesses in the Orient. One is, that India would be greatly weakened, for lack of that commerce; for if that country languishes on account of not having all of that trade, it may well be understood that she will perish if it be taken from her. The other is, that the Dutch in that case would have the entire benefit of the trade, and without much expense; for if [Holanda] with less than half the trade – and that at the cost of so many garrisons and fleets – gains such profits that they are enough to maintain whatever she has in India; if she were to secure all the cloves and, on account of the less cost, thus gain a profit of more than a thousand per cent upon her investments, while the gross amount would be doubled: it is very plain that India would not remain safe, the Western Indias would be more effectively harassed, the rebel states in Flandes would be strengthened, the coasts of España would experience their invasions, and everywhere the treasure that could be obtained from the Molucas alone would cause most injurious effects – as may be seen, with more detailed arguments, in the memorial that I have cited in behalf of the Philipinas, to which [colony] we owe the only compensation [that we receive] for all these losses.

The fourth reason is almost the sequence of what has been said in the third, although it is more general, since it takes notice that the Dutch fleets have entered the Orient with so strong a force that they have often placed India in risk of being lost to us; for if they were aided by the Moorish and heathen kings and the rulers of Persa and Mogòr⁴– and sometimes the Dutch are leagued with the English, who also navigate those seas – their invasion would be irresistible. What has prevented this danger has been the diversion furnished by the Philipinas – not only by diminishing their trade and profits in Moluco (as has been seen), in China, and in other regions, but by compelling them to divide their forces, and to maintain in some places very large ones. India is divided into two parts – [one], from the Cape of Buena Esperanza to the Straits of Sincapura; the other, from the straits to China and Japòn. The first is defended by the Portuguese fleets of India, which seldom go thither through the straits; the second, by the Castilians of Philipinas, who never come here by way of the straits. For both these, it is necessary that the Dutch send thither and maintain squadrons; and therefore it is proved, at this very beginning, that if the fleets of this crown are deficient in either of those regions, and the enemy can transfer all of his naval force to the one that remains [without defense] because there is no diversion [of his forces] in the other, it will be difficult if not impossible to defend [the one to which he goes] – an argument which admits no debate in the naval as well as in the military world. From this it follows that if now the Philipinas fail us Eastern India will remain without aid, and consequently in evident danger of being lost [to us]. This is further confirmed by the fact that, of the two parts into which India is divided, the enemy expends much more of his energy in the second than in the first. In the latter he is content with factories and barter, without keeping any fortified posts; in the former, he maintains the forts of Malayo, Toloco, Tacubo, Malaca, Tacome, Marieco, Motir, Nofagia, Tafacen, Tabelole, Bermevelt, Tabori, Gilolo, Amboino, Lagu, Maruco, Mozovia, Belgio, Bantan, and Hermosa Island. In these nineteen presidios there were, in the year 1616, 3,000 soldiers; 193 pieces of bronze artillery and 310 of iron, and 300 stone-mortars [pedreros]; and thirty war galleons. And all this is solely to defend themselves from the Philipinas, and to attack the islands so that the armed fleets of India shall not sail to that region – or, if they should go thither, it would be easy to stop them at the Strait of Sincapura. If then, the Philipinas were unable to act, and the Dutch should abandon those nineteen forts (which now are many more), as being no longer necessary to them, they would proceed to the coasts of India, and their galleons to those seas. If even when their energies are diverted, their forces divided, and their gains diminished as they are now, they cause so much anxiety, what would it be if, with little if any opposition, their forces united, and their profits increased, they should harass India? It is easy to see that they would occasion that region the utmost distress, and that consequently the Philipinas are an absolutely necessary defense for it.

The fifth reason has the same ground as the fourth; for, on account of the diversion of forces and the expense which the enemy now encounters in the Orient and in the forts of Moluco, he is compelled to refrain from annoying the Western Indias, and must devote less attention, military force, and money to that object. And since what he spends or fails to gain in India enables the Philipinas to oppose or to embarrass him, it follows that if he there shall gain more and spend less, he will here take possession of both [the Indias]. And if the Indias, even with so effective a diversion [of the enemy’s force as they have now], need the Windward Fleet which is being built there, and for which a subsidy of 600,000 ducados is granted annually: in order to dispense with the garrisons, fleets, and expenditures in India everything would have to be increased, so that in the Indias more expense would be incurred for their defense than is consumed in the Philipinas.

The sixth is a reason of honor and profit, for these two admirable results follow from the victories which the inhabitants of Philipinas have gained over the Dutch: honor, on account of the glory which the Catholic arms acquire in those seas, which gains for them the esteem of the Japanese, Chinese, Sianese, Mindanaos, and innumerable other peoples, who serve as spectators in the theatre for such exploits; and profit, since, if the enemy’s forces are weakened it follows that, besides those that he loses in being conquered, he is compelled to expend still greater ones in order to keep his foothold. This is the most notable reason for maintaining powerful squadrons on the sea, in order that if the pirate undertakes to plunder successfully, he will have to do it with so great a force that either he will abandon the prize because he cannot hold it, or he will let it alone because the profits do not make it worth his while. Of the victories which the Spaniards have gained in those seas there are extant histories and accounts; and in the large memorial some of these are mentioned.

The seventh is, that [by the islands] are aided the two crowns of Castilla and Portugal, who are so united and in so fraternal relations in the Orient, each possessing its share of the two parts into which that region is, as we have said, divided. If we are to base our opinion on experience, the facts are evident in the restoration of Moluco; for in the time of Governor Don Juan de Sylva the forces of both crowns were joined, and it is regarded as certain that, if death had not intercepted his designs, he would have driven from those seas the arms of Holanda and of Inglaterra, and awakened fear and dread in many kings who were awaiting the result of so powerful a combination; and, even though success is not always so immediate, it suffices that it should be possible to make the enemy fear, and to lead them to believe that what has occurred sometimes may occur often.

The eighth reason is to protect and preserve the commerce of China for both crowns. For this argument it is taken for granted that this commerce is one of the most beneficial and lucrative of those in the entire Orient; and we can say that there is no other in all the world that equals it. The Oriental traffic of ancient times, which the Romans so highly valued, originated in China and in the drugs, fabrics, and curiosities of that country – although, as they were ignorant of its real origin, they called it the India trade, since they received it from that country. In the larger memorial I have already discoursed upon this at length. Now all the nations in those [Oriental] kingdoms take part in this commerce, but it is conducted most extensively and steadily by the Portuguese of India and the Castilians of Manila; we shall soon relate how important it is to the latter. Of the Portuguese it suffices to say that they possess in China the city of Macan, and the privilege of entering that of Canton; and the commerce of these two cities they maintain through the Strait of Sincapura, though always in danger from the Dutch. But as the profits are so great, they sail by that route; it adds much to their safety that they cross through the seas of Philipinas, and that Macan can find succor in Manila. But if this should be lacking, Macan could not remain many years without ruin, nor could India enjoy the commerce with China, which is one of those which most benefit her; and if the Chinese trade is cut off from India and Manila, the Dutch alone will be strong enough to carry it on. Although they are at present shut out from it by the robberies that they have committed on the Sangleys, they would not find it difficult to bring the latter to friendship with them; for it is already known that when money is lacking in Philipinas the Sangleys carry their merchandise to the Dutch. Therefore, on the preservation of those islands depends that of the Chinese trade.

These eight fundamental reasons are sufficient to prove the importance and necessity that exist for maintaining, preserving, and favoring those islands; for if they were lost the resulting damage would be great and excessive beyond any possible comparison or proportion to what the islands now cost us. And because there is seen in this an error of misapprehension, I will make a statement regarding it that is worthy of much attention and notice. This is, that it costs the royal exchequer more to support the island of San Martin⁵– which is of no use, and has no more effect than to remove an obstacle to the navigation of the Indias, and take away a landing-place from the pirates (who already have numberless others) – than to maintain the Philipinas Islands, which have the utility and effectiveness which I have stated.

For the proof of this, I avail myself of a summary of the detailed statements in the larger memorial, regarding the cost of the Philipinas. For the officials of justice, who govern them, 37,077 pesos; for the entire ecclesiastical estate, 37,277 pesos. In maintaining friendly relations with neighboring kings, 1,500 pesos. In the administration of the royal exchequer, 11,550 pesos. For the land forces at Manila, and in the military posts of all the islands, 229,696 pesos. For wars on land, and the forts in Moluco, 97,128 pesos. For naval war, shipbuilding, and navy-yards, 283,184 pesos. For supplies and provisions for all the soldiers and seamen, 153,302 pesos. These sums amount to 850,734 pesos, which is the expenditure made each year for the islands – not omitting to reckon wages and salaries, scanty though they be. This, therefore, is all the charge for their cost which can be made.

On the credit side of the account, the tributes from the crown encomiendas are worth each year 53,715 pesos; and the two reals which are paid to the king by each Indian in the private encomiendas amount to 21,107 pesos. The licenses which are given to the Sangleys come to 112,000 pesos; and the tributes from these Sangleys, to 8,250. The fifth and the tenth of gold, 750 pesos. The ecclesiastical tithes, which are collected by the royal exchequer for the support of the prelates and clergy, 2,750 pesos. The freight charges in his Majesty’s ships, 350 pesos. The court fines, 1,000 pesos. The customs duties, 38,000 pesos. The mesada and half-annats, 6,000. From these ten sources the income amounts to 243,922 pesos; to this must be added the imposts, freight dues, and customs duties which are collected in Nueva España on the merchandise that comes from the islands – all which amount to 300,000 pesos, and this is income that results and proceeds from the islands; accordingly, by a decree of February 19, 1606, it is commanded that these charges, adding to their amount each year, be remitted to Manila, and that so much less be sent from the royal exchequer of Mexico. And if all these goods are sold and traded in Nueva España once, or two or more times, and pay the customary charges of alcabala,⁶ if the rate of two [per cent] which they usually pay was moderated to 30,000 pesos in the larger memorial, the rate on the said [sales] will certainly amount to 60,000 pesos. With this, the islands now have 593,922 pesos to their credit; so that their [actual] expense cannot be estimated at more than 256,812 pesos – [and that] without counting the proceeds of the Crusade, those from intestate property, or the monopoly of playing-cards.