NATO’s Enlargement and Russia

The Contributions

With its three main parts, each anchored both in the past and the present, this collected volume seeks to achieve a better understanding of the NATO enlargement processes of the 1990s, Russia’s place in them, the policy followed and negotiation practices, as well as the underlying thinking of its main actors.

Alexey Arbatov starts with a comprehensive survey of the issues of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, and delves deeply into the historical origins of the current security dilemma. A profound understanding of the role of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation are indispensable for the survival of human civilization. Nuclear weapons play today, to be sure, a predominantly political role, rather than a military one. Nevertheless, the state of relations between NATO (as, among others, a nuclear alliance) and Russia by early 2021 causes considerable alarm.13

John Kornblum, a direct participant of many basic international negotiations between Russia and NATO and one of the authors of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, highlights the “urgent necessity to act” in today’s world. He makes readers aware of the historical lessons from the Quadripartite Agreement which began the European security conference project. Kornblum’s chapter draws attention to the changes faced by the incoming Biden administration and its Western allies, and the need for a new “Atlantic paradigm” in the digital era. It expresses his hope that democracy and democratic values will remain the “operating system” of this paradigm.

Liviu Horovitz bases his analysis of the NATO enlargement process on newly declassified archival documents. He argues that the role of idiosyncratic motives of particular Western governments during the enlargement processes of the 1990s has been underestimated. The commonly held assumption that NATO enlargement was a Western expansion to Eastern Europe, which exploited Russia’s weakness, continues to dominate. Horovitz reconstructs British internal deliberations between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Prime Minister’s Office. He reveals a desire for securing America’s place in Europe as the main motive of the British actors in the 1990s.

Steven Pifer offers an exceptionally deep insight into the Bill Clinton’s Administration’s hopes and aspirations after German reunification and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. He traces three main tracks in “reshaping Europe,” including the evolution of relations of the US with former Warsaw Pact members, building a relationship between NATO and Russia, and the creation of a partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Pifer provides reflective criticism of all three of these tracks.

Marcin Zaborowski provides a historical overview of the external (predominantly Russian) influence on the nations of East-Central Europe. He explores their attitudes and threat perceptions, as well as resulting defense acquisition policies and defense spending decisions along NATO’s “Eastern Flank.”

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder analyzes “realist” offensive and defensive narratives of Russia’s actions towards Ukraine after the annexation of the Crimea. NATO’s enlargement often serves as a determining factor within these narratives, a conscious or unconscious provocation by the West, or even a self-fulfilling prophecy. These findings underline the interrelation of NATO and Russia, as well as the blind spots associated with the Alliance’s enlargement. Heinemann-Grüder provides a detailed examination of NATO-Ukraine relations and a prognosis for both Brussels and Kyiv based on the lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian War.

Mariana Budjeryn and Andreas Umland address in their contribution the security assurances that Kyiv received in 1994, from the United States, United Kingdom and Russian Federation, in exchange for Ukraine’s signature under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and atomic disarmament. They argue that Russian actions towards Ukraine since 2014 have been profoundly undermining the rationale of the entire international nonproliferation regime.

Pavlo Klimkin, a former Ukrainian foreign minister, explores, in a brief interview with the editor, the Ukrainian position on various questions of Ukraine’s international relations. He touches the 1994 security guarantees to Kyiv and their remaining political value, the Ukrainian perception of the “transatlantic community of values and convictions,” Ukraine’s strategic goals for the years to come, the lost and real chances for successful security treaties, and Ukrainian hopes for a future transatlantic partnership.

Gleb Pavlovsky, a former adviser to Vladimir Putin, offers an exclusive view on the thinking within the Kremlin—and what’s behind it. Pavlovsky provides a detailed analysis based on the sophisticated concept of “unconscious decentering.” He lays out how the Russian leadership (including, presumably, the President of the Russian Federation himself) assesses world relations and Russia’s role in them. He shows what the Kremlin is betting on in the realm of security issues and allows the reader to draw her/his own conclusions on the risks involved. His valuable insight provides crucial keys to a better understanding of the thinking of the Russian leadership.

Roderich Kiesewetter, a German politician representing the largest party in the governing CDU/CSU coalition, offers his views on the security architecture that has emerged since the 1990s. He argues that there was and is a lack of clearly defined Western strategic goals for NATO-Russia relations. However, Russia too “was equally incapable of defining such a vision itself” in the 1990s, according to Kiesewetter. This situation reminds of the current state of affairs. Kiesewetter examines obstacles hindering Western efforts towards promotion of democracy today and makes suggestions for the German policies towards Eastern Europe.

Łukasz Adamski explores the question of the perception of Russian foreign and security policy by the West and its political implications. He scrutinizes the fallacies underlying Western perceptions of Russian thinking and their possible resolution.

Michail Mironjuk and Dmitrij Stefanovic examine the reasons for distrust in Russian-Western relations, and focus on the role of military issues from a Russian perspective. This contribution helps to make the official Russian view on current security policies better understandable.

Reiner Schwalb draws on his long practical experience in Moscow when analyzing Russian programmatic military documents as well as Russian power structures (siloviki).14 He also elaborates on some concrete proposals for Germany’s future Eastern policy, including the field of military cooperation.

The volume contains a multifarious mixture of analytical reflections, competing interpretations and policy recommendations that can help to elaborate a more effective Western strategy towards Russia. The appearance of this collection is also an expression of the readiness of foreign policy experts from Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Germany and the USA to openly discuss and fundamentally reevaluate some burning security issues. This collection unites analysts with very different backgrounds and viewpoints within one volume. Hopefully, the book will thus serve as a forum upon which more fruitful future dialogue can be build.

Acknowledgements

My sincerest thanks go first and foremost to Marina and Alexander Stuppo. In addition, I am very grateful to Alexander Ebner, Joerg Forbrig, Andreas Umland, Robert Enz, Gabriele Metzler, Johannes Varwick, Marcus Pindur, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Peter Hoeres, Anatoliy Adamishin, Lilia Shevtsova, Ulrich Schlie, Daniel Hamilton, Kristina Spohr, Joseph Verbovszky, and Dominic Kahn for giving strength, providing a necessary word in a necessary moment, as well as for offering their support, wisdom, knowledge, encouragement and advice.

Many thanks also personally to each of the fascinating authors for their interest in the topic, their inspiration, cordial openness, stimulating discussions as well as for new friendships and impulses for new ways forward in the field of political science.

Normative rhetoric may seem “cannibalized” or “too visionary” for today’s times, but this volume profited from the wisdom of individuals who did not lose faith in values. These values will shape our future.

* * *

Despite its heavy-handed clumsiness, Russia’s anti-NATO rhetoric is only gaining momentum. It has intensified in connection with the protests in Russia that erupted after the return of Alexey Navalny in January 2021. Navalny is now probably the best-known Kremlin critic in the West, following the poison attack against him and his subsequent medical treatment in Germany. All people protesting against the Kremlin in Russia are being accused of alleged criminal cooperation with the West and also with NATO. The accusations are constructed by Russian organs of power very coarsely, having no logic, let alone factual basis. The consequences are however becoming more dangerous for individuals. These blatant accusations by the Russian regime towards its critics, as well its fundamentally wrong and intentionally perverted interpretation of the historical development of international democratic institutions—including NATO—must be addressed clearly, over and over again.

1 See also the interview with Pavlo Klimkin in this volume.

2 See the contribution of Alexey Arbatov.

3 See, for instance, the contribution of John Kornblum in this volume.

4 Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Open Door: Nato and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 3.

5 Goldgeier, James and Joshua R. Shifrinson, eds. 2020. “Special Issue: Legacies of NATO Enlargement: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Alliance Management.” International Politics 57 (3).

6 Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Open Door: Nato and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Exiting the Cold War, Entering the New World. Washington DC: Foreign Policy Institute: Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

7 Asmus, Ronald D. 2012. Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself in a New Era. New York: Columbia University Press; Hill, William H. 2018. No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989. New York: Columbia University Press; Sarotte, Mary E. 2019. “How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–1995.” International Security 44 (1): 7–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00353; Marten, Kimberley. 2018. “Reconsidering NATO expansion: a counterfactual analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s.” European Journal of International Security 3 (2): 135–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.16 are only the few among the many.

8 For instance, the German volumes on the reunification process: Möller, Horst, Ilse Dorothee Pausch, Gregor Schöllgen, Hermann Wentker und Andreas Wirsching, eds. 2015. Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; or Franzen, Christoph Johannes, Tim Szatkowski and Daniela Taschler, eds. 2020. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1989. Berlin: De Gruyter.

9 NATO. 2020. NATO 2030: United for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General. Brussels: NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

10 See also to the controversies on the so-called European autonomy as one of the latest developments. Borrell, Josep. 2020. “Why European strategic autonomy matters.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 19, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en.

11 Sarotte, Mary E. 2009. 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press; Nünlist, Christian. 2018. “Krieg der Narrative – Das Jahr 1990 und die NATO-Osterweiterung.” SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 2 (4): 389–397. https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2018-4007. See also the transcript of a conversation between the Head of the Political Department of the FRG, Kastrup, and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin in: Möller et al. Die Einheit, “Dok. 64. März 1990.”

12 Gottemoeller, Rose, Thomas Graham, Fiona Hill, Jon Huntsman Jr., Robert Legvold and Thomas R. Pickering. 2020. “It’s time to rethink our Russian policy.” Politico, August 5, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/05/open-letter-russia-policy-391434.

13 Nuclear Crisis Group. 2020. Nato-Russia: Crisis Brief. December 2020. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/NATO-Russia-NCG-Brief_Dec-2020.pdf.

14 The term “siloviki” derives from the Russian word meaning power. It includes representatives of the intelligence services, the military and other state armed forces, and members of the power elite.

Looking for Historical Unlocking Issues of Strategic Stability

Nuclear Deterrence
A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?1

Alexey Arbatov

After thirty years of major reductions in nuclear arsenals to strengthen strategic stability, why are Russia and the United States further diverging in their understandings of the principles of stability? For what reasons, after so many years of joint efforts by the two powers to eliminate incentives for a nuclear first strike against the other, is such a scenario more likely today than at any point over the past thirty years? How is it that, after three decades of successful negotiations on the reduction and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the world is entering a period of disintegration when it comes to the entire system of control over these weapons? And, finally, why is the world entering a new cycle of nuclear and related arms races that is both multifaceted and multilateral?

The United States’ withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and the growing likelihood of the termination of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are returning U.S.-Russia nuclear issues to the forefront of discussions on international security and geopolitics.2

In these discussions, it is difficult to find concepts that are more commonly used—and abused—than strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. Both concepts have a long history. The former has been in official use for nearly thirty years, while the latter has been around for almost seventy. They appear in many state documents and international agreements. Entire libraries of academic literature and propaganda have been written about them, not to mention the reams devoted to both concepts on the Internet, along with oceans of words at countless conferences and symposiums.

Nevertheless, these concepts, their dynamics, and their dialectical interrelationship create new problems time and again. They give rise to paradoxes that, were it not a life-and-death matter for modern civilization, could be considered intellectually fascinating. But, unfortunately, these concepts concern actual matters of life and death. In the current military and political environment, it is no longer inconceivable that war between the United States and Russia could break out in just a few days in the event of a crisis. Such a conflict might culminate with an exchange of nuclear strikes taking as long as just a few hours.

During those hours, hundreds of millions of people in the northern hemisphere would be killed, and everything created by human civilization in the last thousand years would be destroyed. The direct effects would be irreversible, and the secondary effects would likely kill the rest of the world’s population within a number of years, or at least send the remaining population back into a prehistoric existence. The prevention of nuclear war is an indispensable condition for the survival of human civilization, and it is inextricably linked to the concepts of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation.

It might seem that all of the above goes without saying, and that all of this has long been accepted both in theory and practice by politicians, military leaders, civilian experts, and the enlightened public of the world’s advanced nations. Over the past three decades, the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States have been reduced substantially—both in terms of the number of warheads and in terms of total destructive power. Yet despite all of this, the danger of nuclear war is today much greater than it was in the late 1980s.

In recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defense systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats.3 These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet dangerous changes are taking place. This article examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security.

The Genesis of Nuclear Deterrence

The philosophy of nuclear deterrence was born out of the symbiosis of the principle of military deterrence and the emergence of nuclear weapons. The first has thousands of years of history behind it. The latter appeared only in 1945. Intimidating an enemy with the threat of military force—to keep it from pursuing unacceptable actions or to force it into desired behavior—has long been considered a political and psychological function of armies and fleets before they enter into combat actions. Two and a half millennia ago, the Chinese founder of strategic military thinking, Sun Tzu, wrote: “To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.”4

The creation and use of the atomic bomb in 1945 did not immediately give rise to the idea of nuclear deterrence. At first, nuclear weapons were seen only as a new means of warfare, albeit one with unprecedented destructive power. According to official U.S. doctrine of “Massive retaliation” in the 1950s, the actual plan for the use of nuclear weapons—set out in the Pentagon’s first Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP-62—called for quickly following any armed conflict with the Soviet Union by launching massive air strikes, conducted by 1,850 heavy and medium bombers that would drop 4,700 atomic and hydrogen bombs on cities and military installations across the Soviet Union, China, and their allies.5 According to the Pentagon, this attack would have resulted in 800 million casualties across the targeted and adjacent neutral countries.6 That figure was no less than one-third of the global population at the time.

The creation of Soviet nuclear weapons and intercontinental bombers—and later missiles, as delivery means—deprived the United States of its traditional territorial immunity behind two oceans, and forced the two sides to seriously reconsider their views on the relationship between the political and military roles of nuclear weapons. The idea of nuclear deterrence came to the forefront of U.S. military policy. Of course, it was based on real nuclear forces and operational plans for their use. This qualitative shift laid the foundation for formulating the philosophy that nuclear weapons play a predominantly political role, rather than a military one. At the same time, both roles demonstrate the classic law of Hegel’s dialectics on the unity and struggle of opposites (more on this below).