Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Inhaltsverzeichnis

List of Figures and Tables

Abbreviations

Introduction

1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts

1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents

1.2 A historical “autopsy”—explaining the demise of SFRY

1.3 The Bulgarian ethnic models

1.4 Contemporary challenges to ethnic relations

1.5 Strength of state institutions and ethnic conflicts

2. The Role of Political Parties

2.1 The contemporary party systems in Bulgaria

2.1.1 Bipolarity (1990–2001)

2.1.2 Polycentrism, populism, and nativism (2001 until present)

2.2 MRF—electoral support and ideology

2.3 The Bulgarian PRR

2.3.1 Representatives

2.3.2 Origins, ideology, development

2.3.3 The PRR and the Bulgarian ethnic model

2.3.4 A glimpse into the future of the PRR

2.4 Roma, crime and politics

3. Channeling Ethnic Conflicts

3.1 The integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989

3.2 The legislation and the judicial system

3.2.1 General framework for analysis

3.2.2 The PADA

3.2.2.1 Purpose and concept

3.2.2.2 Scope

3.2.2.3 Genuine and determining occupational requirements

3.2.2.4 Positive action

3.2.2.5 Minimum requirements and protection of rights

3.2.2.6 Burden of proof and victimization

3.2.2.7 Dissemination of information and social dialogue

3.2.2.8 Equality body

3.2.2.9 Compliance and sanctions

3.3 Discrimination against Roma ethnic group: case studies

3.3.1 Segregation

3.3.2 Use of excessive force by the police and lack of effective investigation

3.3.3 Hate crimes

Conclusion: A Story about Garbage Trucks

References

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society

Copyright

To my daughter Elena

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

1. Discrimination against Roma here

2. The scope of state functions here

3. Strength of state institutions and scope of state functions here

4. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI (Graph View) here

5. Votes for the MRF in the elections for BNA, 1991–2014 here

6. Fears of the MRF voters here

7. Votes for the main PRR parties here

8. Votes for Ataka, NFSB, and MRF in the parliamentary

elections (2005, 2009, 2013, 2014) here

9. Social distances (2016) here

10. Social distances (2008 and 2016) here

11. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—thefts here

12. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups

—robberies here

13. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—premeditated murders here

14. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—

batteries here

15. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—rapes here

16. Social distances. “Do you agree or disagree with each of

the following statements?” here

Tables

1. Main ethnic groups in Bulgaria since 1878 here

2. Main sources of income for Roma households here

3. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI here

4. Control of corruption in six states in 1996, 2003, 2008, 2013 here

5. Ethnic profile of the political parties in the Bulgarian

National Assembly in 2009 here

6. Crimes and Roma suspects here

7. Number of complaints lodged with the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination per year here

8. Use of force by the Bulgarian police by years here

Abbreviations

Introduction

The relative ethnic peace which Bulgaria has enjoyed in the recent decades is among the few remaining bastions of national self-confidence. Amid bitter antagonism, bloodshed, and financial crises, which devastated many countries after the collapse of the Communist bloc, the sanctity of interethnic accord has, in general, been revered in Bulgaria. Its preservation is possible because the political system, despite its multiple drawbacks, is still able to tame the flashing sparks. Not only the limited comprehensive research on the topic but also the current affairs testify to the relevance of this book, dedicated to the role of political institutions in ethnic conflicts in Bulgaria after 1989. As I am writing these lines, Lyutvi Mestan, the leader of the newly formed ethnic party Democrats for Responsibility Solidarity and Tolerance (DOST),1 states that the amendment of the Election Code,2 which the majority in the Bulgarian National Assembly (BNA) approved on April 28, 2016, “is a continuation of the Revival Process.”3 The events in Katunitsa, Orlandovtsi, Garmen, and Radnevo indicate that the clashes and physical violence between Bulgarians and Romani, who remain subjected to social exclusion and marginalization, are on the raise. In addition, there are numerous other less visible and often ignored outbursts of hostility on ethnic grounds which happen on a daily basis. The issues discussed in the pages that follow are even more pertinent when we consider the international context. The principles and values on which the European Union (EU) is built are challenged by the constant migrant flow from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other failing states. At the same time, the increasingly menacing shadow of terrorism revealed its poisonous tentacles in the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Burgas (2012), Paris (2015), Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Würzburg, Ansbach, Munich, and Berlin (2016).

The subject of this study is the way the political institutions manipulate the ethnic conflicts during the past 27 years. Political institutions are relatively durable and sustainable social groupings or structures operating under statutory or common rules and regulatory systems that are responsible for the political process (March and Olsen 2008: 3).4 In a narrow sense, to them pertain the institutions forming the backbone of the state which are at the core of the political process and are empowered, whenever appropriate, to apply coercion—the parliament, the government, the judiciary bodies, the public administration, etc. In a broad sense to them must be added the political institutions-intermediaries5 as well as the institutions that postulate the norms of social behavior such as the constitution and electoral law. In order to achieve optimal heuristic value the analysis will be limited to the political parties, the parliament, the government, the judiciary, and the relevant legislative framework. I will not dwell on the role of the presidential institution or the media. The impact of the tidal wave of migrants from failed states and the threats to national security posed by terrorism are also not going to be examined. Furthermore, I have purposefully not included a full-blown geopolitical analysis. This does not mean that, for example, the neo-Ottoman doctrine of the Turkish President Recep Erdogan and the hybrid propaganda, employed by the Kremlin and the traditionalist values defended by the Russian diplomacy, in the concept of “Conservative Revolution” which seeks natural allies in the populist radical right (PRR) and left parties in the EU,6 are not relevant to this study (Koritarov 2016, Minchev 2016, Vasilev 2016). However, in order to make my task more realistic and manageable, I decided not to incorporate at length these issues in the project.7

I have also resisted the temptation to draw parallels between the Bulgarian case and the ethnic issues on the Balkan Peninsula as a whole or, even still, between the ethnic conflicts in this country and those in polities across Europe. At first glance, the reasons for such comparisons are compelling. For example, not unlike the ethnic formations in Bulgaria, the ethnic parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)8 play a significant role in its political system.9 To go even further, at present, journalists persistently bring forward the question of the rights of the “Bulgarian minority” in Albania; others, who discuss the dramatic events surrounding the Catalan independence referendum which took place on October 1, 2017, juxtapose the Revival Process in Bulgaria with the policies of “el Caudillo de la Última Cruzada y de la Hispanidad”10 Francisco Franco (1892–1975) toward the Basques.11 Although I am familiar with the ethnic relations in other Balkan countries, as well as the ethnopolitical issues in EU in general, I have to admit that I am by no means a pundit in all of them. The real danger here is that, at the end, I could inadvertently open a can of worms. It could be detrimental to the project if I embark on the perilous journey of drawing such parallels throughout the book. For these reasons, the only in-depth comparison that I explore in detail is between the Bulgarian ethnic models and the former Yugoslav federation.12

I do not believe that conflicts are necessarily something “evil,” or that they should be avoided at all costs. As it was famously pointed out by Ralf Dahrendorf, they may be beneficial to society (Dahrendorf 1959, 2007). The latter could not survive without both consensus and conflict.13 In my view, however, conflicts become particularly dangerous and volatile whenever they stem from politicized ethnic identity14 coupled with unsuccessful attempts at their institutionalization. My scientific curiosity has been provoked by such problematic cases and the consequences that they have for the Bulgarian political system and society. It is equally important to clarify (my take on) some other terms used in this study. Ethnic identity is the sense of belonging to a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4–6, Limenopoulou 2004: 2). A minority ethnic group is any ethnic group in a given society that forms an appreciable subsystem with limited access to roles and activities central to the economic and political institutions of the society (Shermerhorn 1996: 18). By “ethnic party,” I understand a political party, the majority of whose constituents belong to one or more ethnic minorities. An “ethnic entrepreneur” is a person (typically a politician) who voices and uses the interests, everyday challenges, and fears of a particular ethnic group (or groups) in order to mobilize political support for a certain cause.

The structure of the project corresponds to the facets of the subject. The first part necessarily begins with an adjustment of “the optics” through which the analysis will be performed. In a dynamic and interdisciplinary field, such as the study of ethnic conflicts, there is a lot of controversy regarding the notions and methods of investigation. There are, as well, disagreements on the use and content of the conceptual apparatus. The advantages of an institutional approach to conflicts, which I use in this work, are illustrated mainly through the means of the exploration of the tragic demise of the Yugoslav federation. The study of ethnic relations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the mistakes of the political elites in particular, is an invaluable lesson stimulating the better understanding of our own country. Using this study as a starting point of the analysis of the Bulgarian case, I then pinpoint the specifics of contemporary challenges in front of ethnic relations in Bulgaria. The second part examines the role of political parties both outside and inside the parliament. I trace the developments of the ethnic model in its interconnection with the first and the second party systems. I highlight the particularities in ideology, political support, and mobilization of the main ethno-political formation—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), as well as of the representatives of the PRR. Last but not least, I discuss various case studies on Roma, crime and politics. The third part of the book is devoted to the integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989, especially those that are targeted toward Roma. I assess the role of the judicial system and the antidiscrimination legislation.

There is a plethora of explanatory concepts about the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts. The “classic” schools of thought are the primordialist (Geertz 1973), the instrumentalist (A. Smith 1986), and the constructivist (Anderson 2006). Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all of these schools. Significant approaches, some of which are influenced or related to the three fundamental paradigms, are the institutionalist (Lijphart 1968, 1977, McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hechter 2000, Osipov 2013),15 the environmental (or economic, which can be derived from, for example, Marxism), the ethnocultural (MG Smith 1969), and the theory of modernization (Horowitz 1985, Altermatt 1998).16 An “army” of scholars has examined ethnic relations in Bulgaria: political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, historians, ethnographers, economists, philosophers, and others. Nonetheless, there is a relative lack of comprehensive studies dedicated entirely to the role of political institutions for deterrence and/or incitement of ethnic conflicts during the last 27 years. Instead, these issues are discussed in chapters or sections of monographs and compendiums (e.g., Kertikov et al. 1990, Makariev 1999, 2017, Hopken 2000, Dimitrov 2001, Dronzina 2004, Mizov 2008, Engström 2009, Karasimeonov 2010, Zlatanova 2013) and, above all articles that highlight specific aspects of the problem, for example, the link between political parties and ethnic conflicts (Smilov 2006, 2007, 2008, Kabakchieva 2008, Todorov 2012), the Bulgarian ethnic models (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Mitev 2005, Bosakov 2006, Pamporov 2008, Geiselmann and Karamelska 2010), the integration policies targeting minorities (Grekova 2008, Gulubov 2008, Ivanov 2008, Rechel 2008), etc. For example, although the important recent book by Plamen Makariev—The Public Legitimacy of Minority Claims—explores the Bulgarian case as well, its scope is much more ambitious and broader17 than the purpose of mine. Makariev’s work is a study of public policies concerning the national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it analyses these policies through the means of political philosophy, in particular through the prism of “the Habermasian version of the theory of public deliberation and the model of deliberative democracy” (Makariev 2017: 9).

Of importance for the better grasp of the questions that my work attempts to answer are studies of nationalism (Kabakchieva 2006), postcommunist politicization of the religious (Krasteva 2015), ethnic identity (Mizov 2003, Nedelcheva 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, Bosakov 2004, Ahmed 2008, Nedelcheva and Topalova 2010) and ethnic relations (Mitev 1994, Zografova 1996, Genov 2004, 2005, Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007, Pamporov 2012), practices of controlled voting (Bezlov and Gounev 2012b, Stoychev 2016), economic dimensions of the Revival Process (Avramov 2017), public spheres in Bulgaria and Serbia (Dawson 2014), etc. An imposing amount of academic research illuminates the actions of political institutions in the conflicts that marked the breakup of former Yugoslavia and the constitutional crisis in Macedonia (Flere 1991, Vukovic 1997, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hinkova 1998, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Todorov 2002, Dronzina 2004, Garabedian 2007, Detrez and Segaert 2008, Banchev 2009, Minchev 2009).

The precise meaning and place of the “Bulgarian ethnic model” in the political system has been a constant object of heated debates and discussions not only in the scientific community but also in the public sphere. In my opinion, although undoubtedly charged ideologically, the term is not void of content or a shallow description of a myth. In fact, several such models operated since the Liberation in 1878 (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). Their apex has been in 1940s, when the decisive intervention of the institutions (the monarch, the parliament, and the Bulgarian Patriarchate) led to the Rescue of Bulgarian Jews from deportation (Bar Zohar 1998, Todorov 2001, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). In my view, generally speaking, the model aims to guarantee the rights and freedoms of all ethnic and confessional communities. It has two elements, a dynamic one, as well as another which is much more stable. Its main building blocks are a legislative framework, which obviously changed through the years, and the specifics of Bulgarian political culture. I believe that the model not only reflects the idiosyncrasies of the latter but also influences it. The essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model(s) is not merely a combination of policy measures or a modus operandi of particular institutions. In fact it could be independent of or even “act” against the normative framework which the state imposes on society. This approach is confirmed by the fact that even during the Revival Process (1984–89),18 Bulgarian Turks and Roma, “manifesting wisdom and understanding,”19 accepted that this policy was not instigated or supported by the ethnic majority. Thus the amicable, neighborly relations between ethnic Bulgarians and minorities were, as a whole, preserved in spite of the discriminative and violent actions that the state undertook (Kertikov et al. 1990). The ambivalence of the term “ethnic model,” a phenomenon of the political culture and an institutional mechanism for the integration of ethnic communities, is expressed as well in the political rhetoric.20

When they discuss the political system, most scholars do not perceive or outline an immediate threat to the nonviolent relations between the ethnic groups. During the first decade after the beginning of transition to a democratic political system, in particular, there was a consensus among mainstream political parties, on the necessity of preserving the ethnic peace. This tacit agreement is enshrined in the Constitution of Bulgaria from July 13, 1991, as well as in the legislation as a whole. Using the examples of Bulgaria and Macedonia, Jenny Engström claims that democratization can prevent violent conflict in ethnically divided societies (Engström 2009, 2014). Engström’s analyses contain many indispensable insights into Bulgaria’s road to democracy. However she does not compare the current ethnic model with its “predecessors.” Engström paints an overly optimistic picture of the contemporary model that overlooks some of its important flaws, development, and deterioration.21