The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.

I. Miracles

1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for common events.

1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes.

2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, from that day to this.

3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles alone, can account for those events.

4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception in the world, is that the things really happened.

5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful.

2. Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to mere history.

1.) Additional. His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from Christ, after his ascension.

2.) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of others incidentally, as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote.

3. Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the case with no other religion.

1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.

2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles.

3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing.

4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves.

5.) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of the same nature.

6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against their interests, as these did.

4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice some possible objections.

Objec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies.

Ans. 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof.

2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts; and so does disease, in particular instances. But when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that they saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest evidence.

3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to religion, but the contrary.

4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c.

Objec. 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles and first Christians.

Ans. Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief.

Objec. 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles.

Ans. Not oftener than by other pretences.

Objec. 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence.

Ans. 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the latter would not be impaired. The objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in cases not related to each other, and one is proved false, the other must not be believed!

2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent, or misled.

3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others.

II. As to the evidence from prophecy

1. Obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight.

2. A long series of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the objection that particular prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them.

Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it capable of such application.

So if a long series of prophecies be applicable to the present state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so intended.

Besides, the ancient Jews, before Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just as Christians do now.

3. If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For,

1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not knowing the whole mind of the author.

2.) If the book is a compilation, the authors may have meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight more than human.

REMARK

This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT

We now proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot be expected here; but something should be said, especially as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.

The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and final happiness.

I. Consider this revelation as a history

1. It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world.

1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.

2.) Distinguishes God from idols.

3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in a world considered as apostate and wicked.

4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not for their importance as mere political events.

5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world.

2. It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral.

1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.

2.) So that doubts of its truth confirm that truth, for in this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so.

3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been thus confuted.

3. It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them.

1.) Interpositions in their behalf.

2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.

3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to raise a general expectation, &c.

4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles.

4. Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new religion.

II. As to the authenticity of this history

Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he would find,

1. That natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this book. This no more disproves natural religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before Euclid.

2. The great antiquity of revelation.

3. That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts.

4. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its fidelity.

1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the manners of that age and country.

 

2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.

3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, taken alone, seem strange to some, in this day; but not more so than things now occurring.

4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative.

5. That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.

6. That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement.

7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; whose form of government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race.

8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.

9. That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till now.

10. That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted.

CONCLUSION

1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.

2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.

3. These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have been familiar with them.

4. The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of something more than human in this matter.

1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them cannot be.

2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but the conformity itself cannot be denied.

3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but they remain probabilities.

5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that together they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it.

6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best.

7. Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be.

8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force of a whole argument.

9. Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.

CHAPTER VIII

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT

If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these: – it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion: – it will not make men religious to show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent: – the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence: – no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction: – mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.

I. As to requiring a solution of all difficulties

1. This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.

2. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know.

3. It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature.

II. As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious

1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being religious.

2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim.

3. If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, without certainty of being right.

III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion

1. Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we should.

2. We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know to be facts.

3. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.

4. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible.

5. Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves them to be credible.

IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt

1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make exertion.

2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger.

3. Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not be such, if it compelled assent.

4. We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show an action to be prudent.

V. As to the small influence of the analogical argument

1. As just observed, religion is a test, and an exercise, of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man’s own concern.

2. Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe or not.

3. Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence.

Further. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof; which though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot be answered.

Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,

1. To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof.

2. Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their scepticism; and a good deal beside.

3. Thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is real. It confirms all facts to which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract reasonings.

CONCLUSION

Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.

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If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together.

It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it.

May, 1736.