The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature
TextPART II
CHAPTER I
IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY
Every one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it
I. As a republication of natural religion
1. It gives the moral system of the universe.
1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that
– Jehovah created all things.
– ” governs all things.
– Virtue is his law.
– Mankind will be judged according to character.
2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.
3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance.
4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by peculiar institutions.
Objec. The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done.
Ans. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good.
2. The benefits of Christianity are not small.
3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its effects. Things are to be judged by their genuine tendencies.
4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence.
5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct and persuade others.
II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason
1. A mode of salvation for the ruined.
2. Duties unknown before.
3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.
1.) Hence the form of baptism.
2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relations to them.
4. The manner of external worship.
III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity
1. Those who think natural religion sufficient, must admit that Christianity is highly important.
2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is an evident obligation.
3. These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason.
4. If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance?
5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly.
REMARKS
1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations.
1.) For moral precepts we can see the reason: for positive we cannot.
2.) Moral duties are such prior to command; positive duties are such because commanded.
3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it moral or positive.
2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.
1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.
2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.
– Positive institutions are means to moral ends.
– Ends are more excellent than means.
– Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from moral principle.
3.) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so are on a level; but the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two interfere.
3. There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some suppose.
1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.
2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.
3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive institutions, because less important than moral.
– We are bound to obey all God’s commands.
– A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense.
CONCLUSION
This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the Scriptures.
CHAPTER II
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS
Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.
I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of Christianity
1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of reason, or of experience.
2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike the apparent course of nature.
1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what is the course of nature in this little world.
2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things greatly unlike.
3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculous, still that does not make it improbable.
II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world
1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world.
2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, but of fact.
3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the world, now it is made.
4. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or extent, to which a power was exerted.
5. There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a revelation when created.
6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and material proof.
III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, after the course of nature was settled
1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case.
2. This would require us to know the history of some other world.
3. Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would be very precarious.
To be more particular,
1. There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved – which yet is overcome by almost any proof.
– Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them incredible.
2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature depends.
– Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence.
3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth of instruction.
4. Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c.
CONCLUSION
1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.
2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.
3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.
CHAPTER III
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GOD
Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them.
I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world
1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.
2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.
3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
4. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.
II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given by revelation.
2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any revelation he might make.
3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.
4. Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s general government?
6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation as unsuitable.
III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation
1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.
2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still should control our conduct.
IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible
1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.
2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities.
1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine they find improbabilities.
2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.
– It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns him.
– Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to discover for years.
– Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be a deceiver.
– Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.
V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence
For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.
1. This does not prove the acts not miraculous.
2. The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it.
3. To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, is but saying why did not God give a higher degree of miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.
4. God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them.
5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest manner.
VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects
1. In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study.
2. The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about,
1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.
2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality.
3. It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries made.
4. Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and ascertaining Bible truth.
Objec. The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence, compared to spiritual.
Ans. 1. The cases are parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.
Ans. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of their value.
Objec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?
Ans. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.
1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to any without care and study.
2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured.
3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce more disease.
4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.
5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.
6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even with the prospect of a cure.
7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready to take it.
All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.
VII. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the objections against its morality
1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.
2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would be immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the action.
3. None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c.
4. God may command the taking of life or property because these are his.
5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very notion of religion as a trial.
6. The sum of the whole is, objections against the scheme of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no objections against its morality. Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the evidence, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [i. e. ch. vii.]
CHAPTER IV
CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD
In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.
But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, or credible.
It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended.
If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.
[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.]
I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension
1. God’s general plan is to conduct things gradually, so that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves.
2. Christianity is a particular arrangement, under this general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion.
3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.
1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.
2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it.
3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came.
4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.
5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.
4. Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.
5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed.
6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature.
II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to accomplish ends
1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object and end.
2. Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.
III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature
1. Why do we say there are laws of nature?
1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e. g.
· Pestilence.
· Storms.
· Earthquakes.
· Diversities of human powers.
· Association of ideas.
2.) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws.
3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws.
4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.
2. Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God’s general laws of wisdom. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c.
3. We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.
1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be likely to be a scheme.
2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature.
3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner as objections against the other.
Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness, the next thing is to discuss objections in particular.
As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will be considered here.
Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in their designs.
Ans. 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace.
2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.
3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive.
4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; e. g. animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.
5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another.
6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.
CHAPTER V
OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM
Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.
I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others
1. If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?
2. The objection therefore is not only against Christ’s mediation, but all mediation.
II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he should punish
1. Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb is of falling from a precipice.
2. This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous.
III. In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad consequences of actions do not always follow
1. We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it.
1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.
2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of our misdeeds.
3.) Still more if assisted.
2. It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness.
3. The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion.
4. Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases.
5. If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater.
6. A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.
7. As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final impenitence.
8. Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right.
9. Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon.
IV. There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities
1. We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit to remit punishment.
2. Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how to prevent them.
3. Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves.
4. Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests?
5. In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors, why should it as to future things?
6. Were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government.
7. It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be so, even if we knew it might in some cases.
8. The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.
V. In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon and safety
1. Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.
2. Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.
3. That repentance alone will not secure pardon.
4. That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.
5. That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural government.
6. That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men.
7. All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt.
VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory sacrifice
1. He is “that prophet.”
1.) Declared the will of God.
2.) Published anew the law of nature.
3.) Taught with authority.
4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.
5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.
6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.
7.) Set us a perfect example.
2. He has a kingdom which is not of this world.
1.) Founded a church.
2.) Governs it.
3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.
4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.
3. He is a propitiatory sacrifice.
1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told.
2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.
3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his claim to it.
4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher.
5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was procured.
VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office
1. We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.
2. Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.
3. The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty.
1.) We see, in this world, the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of the guilty.
2.) But Christ suffered voluntarily.
4. Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, vicarious sufferings may be necessary.
1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs us suffering and toil.
2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another.
5. Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin.
6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature.
7. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must own he is no judge, and could not understand why it should be necessary, if it were so!
VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty
1. God instructs us by experience.
2. This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small part of his providence.
3. The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and Christ’s execution; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed.
4. Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.
CHAPTER VI
SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY
It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.
But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.
Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.
I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence
1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.
2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.
3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.
4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.
5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.
6. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the probabilities of success are against them.
II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal
1. Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures of the same species.
2. Yet it is certain that God governs.
3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.
4. The Jewish religion was not universal.
5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.
6. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations.
7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.
8. Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to instruct his neighbor.
9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.
III. Practical reflections
First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, may be part of our probation.
1. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.
2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.
Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.
1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so.
2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we knew it was true.
3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.
4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.
5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.
Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.
1. They constitute a wholesome discipline.
1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.
2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.
2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the principal trial. A full conviction of its truth would constrain some to obedience.
Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion.
1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.
2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true.
3. Looks at objections rather than replies.
4. Treats the subject ludicrously.
Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men.
1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their moral accountability.
2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecy.
3. If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understanding the proof.
4. If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the sciences.
Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an earthly master.
Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are not parallel.
Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.
Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may be doubt, is often fatal.
CHAPTER VII
POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY
Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evidence of its truth; i. e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.