Kaliningrad – an ambivalent transnational region within a European-Russian scope

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The developing of generational change and perception of cultural and historical heritage among Kaliningradians and followed change of cultural paradigm are resulted from a complex social und public process. It may be distinguished the process of cognition under the signs of «complex of temporality», «outpost in the West» and «suitcase mood». Attention is given to the turn of 1960—70s, which I believe is appropriate to be designated as the beginning of the mastering of the cultural urban landscape.

This chapter also devoted to theoretical approaches to the Kaliningrad region as exclave in consequence of the collapse of the USSR.

The next two chapters are based on empirical material including interviews and participated observations. The chapter «Positioning between Europe and Russia: strategies and experiences of Europeanization and exceptionality of Kaliningrad everyday» discloses the issue under the motto «what is the European everyday life of Kaliningradians?»

The strategy of everyday practices is affected by the emotional sentiments under the slogans of «fragment of Russia», «poor neighbor» and «pilot region». The Small border traffic, which was put into practice as an example of cross-border «European» everyday life in Kaliningrad is disclosed under the title «Hallo, Lidl, hallo Bedronka». Motives, moods, expectations from trans-boundary movements are viewed through the prism of emotional perception of territorial marginality as the characteristic and inevitable property of daily life in Kaliningrad.

Through the content of the chapter come the issue of «separatist sentiment» as a manifestation of «distinctiveness» and consciousness of the «uniqueness» as part of the public discourse and issue of loyalty to state. The Spirit of «pilot-ness» among Kaliningradians plays role of justification and attribution of distinctiveness of regional culture. «Pilot-ness» is understood as a concept with mostly a positive connotation.

The issue of consciousness of the third generation of Kaliningradians is based on the historical heritage as an actor of the transformation of mentality, which nourishes the discourse about the significance of the historic core of the city and cultural heritage. We approach the potentiality to reflect the past in the present and affect the future.

During interviews the question of «how and who distinguish themselves as young Kaliningradians» was articulated, as well as the adequacy and applicability of the issue «periphery» and metaphor of «bridge» on the boundary of Russian-EU landscape.

Appeal to the issue of the Kaliningradian identification on the transnational space takes place through the prism of All-Russian National Census 2010, which uncovered and marked the phenomenon of nationality «Kaliningradian» as reflection of marginality, rootlessness, and ambivalence.

The last chapter «Kaliningrad regional culture: self-consciousness (Selbstverständigung) in transnational space» reveals positioning and self-identification in the context of Kaliningradians boundary modalities. The historical context and cultural transborder’s dialog plays a role through the prism of migration mobility after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The issue of borderland communities occupies a prominent place in the theory of anthropology and sociology. In this chapter, extensive attention is paid to the perception of the «space» and the aspiration of self-identity, as well as to the theme of Kaliningrad regional culture as a component (periphery) of the Russian national culture and as a link to the European cultural space.

The final part of the last chapter is devoted to empirical research in the «remote field» in relation to the «home field». During two years I had numerous interviews with Kaliningradians, which temporarily or permanently live in Berlin and find the field for the implementation of their motivations, ideas and projects. My respondents were young specialists and teams of professionals who implement and develop their startup initiatives and projects in the field of culture and innovative technologies.

I has spent considerable time searching for relevant respondents and localization of participating observation, because Kaliningradians in Berlin are not numerous and scattered among different co-working spaces and events. A process of search revealed that the consolidating center or space does not exist and is not even forming.

I study the role of startup scene as a channel of transnational mobility for young Kaliningradians and analyzed this role, within entrepreneurs’ initiatives of Kaliningradians in the Berlin startup-scene through theories of self-identity and transmigration.

2. The Kaliningrad region and its historical background

2.1. Birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast

The Kaliningrad regional culture is marked by the presence of ethno-cultural, geopolitical, and historical phenomena. It represents intensive cross-cultural interaction so that it has a considerable sociocultural dynamics and increasing cultural uncertainty. This comprehension is important for the study of the features of ethno-cultural particularity of the Kaliningrad region in terms of European neighbourhood. In this regard, the issues of correlation of national, local, and regional dimensions acquire urgency. The establishment of the region almost 70 years ago as a Soviet Oblast initiated the formation of peculiar social and cultural phenomenon.

The 20th century is characterized by significant and momentous changes on the map of Europe, which suddenly affected the way of life of millions of people and their domicile. The Kaliningrad region is one of the smallest regions of the Russian Federation, which has found a new history, cultural, and social profile due to incorporation to the Soviet Union in 1945. This fact was possible in consequence of World War II and of the diplomatic negotiations that took place between the US, Great Britain, and the USSR.

An intent look at this history is a significant step to grasp a full-scale perspective on the issue. How has the fate of former East Prussia been decided that resulted on the map of Europe a new territorial entity, the Kaliningrad region? Familiarity with this history provides an understanding of how ambiguous the process was. Appeal to the history helps us to understand the peculiarities of perception of this area by the first settlers and official Soviet authorities after the war, to estimate the origins of the contemporary post-Soviet identity of Kaliningradians and their interests in the neighbourhood countries of the European Union and their territorial isolation from the «large Russia».

The issue of East Prussia has appeared in the records of high-level diplomatic negotiations in the initial phase of World War II, when the outcome of the war was not known. On 5 December 1941, during the meeting with the Soviet ambassador in London, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill has explained his idea: «The main challenge is to once and for all eliminate the German threat. This task requires the complete disarmament of Germany at least within of one generation and the fragmentation of Germany, especially separation of Prussia»110.

On 16 December 1941, Joseph Stalin in Moscow during negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed to add to the draft agreement on joint actions the secret protocol on separation of Germany after the war into few independent states. The part of East Prussia with Königsberg he proposed to transfer to the USSR under a term of 20 years as a guarantee of reimbursement of incurred losses from the war with Germany111. This attempt to probe English colleagues was not accident: In fact, it was based on the point of view of Churchill, who expressed his opinion a little earlier in conversations with Soviet representatives in London.

During negotiations, Anthony Eden said that Great Britain promised Poland that its borders would be settled at the final peace conference after the war. Stalin suggested that «the western border of Poland will include East Prussia and Corridor (Gdansk). Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union has to go along the river Neman, and Tilsit should be in the hands of Lithuania, which is constituted as a portion of the USSR. Further to the south this border should go roughly along the Curzon line112, which can be partially modified to a certain point»113. By insisting on the immediate recognition of borders of the USSR by the British government, Stalin stated unequivocally that he «puts the conclusion of any kind of Anglo-Soviet agreement under condition of an agreement on this issue»114.

 

Thus, from the very beginning of the war the issue of East Prussia became a part of the Polish question, which was of strategic importance for the Great Powers in framing East European policy. Despite East Prussia being part of Germany, the fate of Konigsberg in times of negotiations was dependent on the Polish question.

The dynamics of the negotiations on the subject can be tracked in the course of major conferences and meetings of representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK, as well as those of the Polish government-in-exile.

At one of the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK (19—30 October 1943), which was actually a rehearsal for the Tehran conference, the issue of the fate of Germany was considered. This question was raised on the initiative of the US. Eden laid out the plan of the British government on the future of Germany: «We would like to divide the Germany into separate states; in particular, we would welcome the detachment of Prussia from the rest of Germany»115. According to Eden, Franklin Roosevelt told him about the need of formation on the territory of Germany of three new states – Prussia, the Federation of Rhineland, and the South-German Union. The US government was divided on the question of the forms of decentralization of Germany, but its influential members were in favour of the fragmentation of Eastern Prussia.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in reply said that the public opinion of the Soviet Union, «speaks for the dismemberment of Germany by addressing this issue on top of allies»116.

The reference to public opinion in the Soviet Union is cynical, as it is obvious that it had no place and could not have any. However, this is a very important point, which is worth paying attention to. At that time, the military, party staff, and the civilian population began to form an idea of Prussia as a ’centuries-old bridgehead for aggression on Russia’, as «the main source of German militarism».

At the fourth session of the Tehran conference of the three Allied powers – the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November – 1 December 1943), American President Roosevelt offered to discuss the issue of the partition of Germany. He said that in order to ’stimulate’ the debate on this issue, he would like to present the «plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five states» drawn up by him two months ago117. He suggested, «Prussia must be weakened and possibly reduced in size»118.

In Tehran, from the start of negotiations on the post-war borders in Europe, the issue of East Prussia was considered by the Allied powers as part of the Polish question.

Churchill strongly sought to reach the agreements that he could present to the representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. According to his suggestion, a new Polish state should be located between the Curzon Line and the Oder, including East Prussia.

Stalin said, «Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea. Therefore, Russians would need to have ice-free ports of Konigsberg, Memel and some part of the East Prussia. Moreover, historically this is originally Slavic lands. If the British agreed to transfer us mentioned area, then we will agree with the formula proposed by Churchill»119. Churchill reacted to this proposal with benevolent curiosity: «This is a very interesting suggestion, which I will look into»120.

Indeed, the agreement reached in Tehran largely determined the post-war fate of Eastern Prussia. However, at that moment the Western Allies believed that much was still to come and that they would be able to win back some positions. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took the irrevocable and uncompromising course for the future inclusion of Poland and East Prussia into its own sphere of influence.

The prevailing practice of the international law permitted withdrawal of certain parts of the state aggressor as a sanction against this state. In this case, the sanction was imposed primarily on the territory, which was used as a springboard for attack to prevent the revival of aggression in future.

On 1 February 1944, Churchill informed Stalin in a message about the meeting with representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London: «I told them that we went to war to protect Poland, we went for it not because of any particular borderline, but for the establishment of a strong and independent Poland…»121

On 4 February 1944, Stalin, in his reply to Churchill concerning borders of Poland, reiterated, «As for your statement to the Poles that Poland could considerably extend its borders to the west and north, then, as you know, we agree with it, but with amendment. About this amendment, I spoke to you and President Roosevelt in Tehran. We claim the north-eastern part of East Prussia, including the ice-free port Königsberg, which should be ceded to the Soviet Union. This is the only piece of German territory, which we claim…»122

In a letter to Stalin, which was received in Moscow on 27 February 1944, Churchill for the first time explicitly stated that the British government supported the transfer of Königsberg and surrounding area to the Soviet Union and considered this claim «as fair»… «The land of this part of East Prussia stained with blood of Russian… therefore, Russian have historical and well-founded claim to this German territory». In the same message, Churchill for the first time spoke in favour of «resettlement of the German population»123.

Winston Churchill and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antony Eden were on a visit to Moscow on the 9—18 October 1944. The head of the Polish government-in-exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was present during the conversations, asked if he could know which western boundary was defined for Poland in Teheran. Vyacheslav Molotov said that the border along Oder was considered without anyone’s objection. Eden said that «the idea had been that the frontier could be moved as far west toward the Oder as the Poles wished to go». Churchill assured him: «All of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg was to go to Poland»124.

In early 1945, Soviet troops arrived at the borders of East Prussia. Because of «the East Prussian strategic offensive» of the Red Army (13 January—25 April 1945) on 9 April, the garrison of Konigsberg surrendered. The surrender of Konigsberg actually reinforced the political arrangements over East Prussia. From that moment onwards, the region was under the control of the Soviet Army.

After heated debates on the Yalta conference, the Allies agreed that the eastern border of Poland would have to pass on the «Curzon Line». Therefore, it can be argued that at Yalta Conference in February 1945, the head of the USSR, the USA, and the Great Britain almost solved the issue of the future borders of Poland and the fate of Eastern Prussia. President Roosevelt agreed with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. On the fifth plenary session of the Yalta Conference, it was agreed that «compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Königsberg line…»125

The agreement in principle was reached – only the details remained to be discussed. This discussion took place at the Conference of Potsdam from 17 July to 2 September 1945. At the seventh meeting of the heads of governments on 23 July, the issue of the transfer of the region around Königsberg to the Soviet Union was discussed. Stalin recalled that «President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill at the Tehran Conference gave their consent in this regard, and this issue has been agreed between us. We would like to have this agreement confirmed at this conference»126. In response to the exchange of opinions, the US and Great Britain delegations confirmed their consent given in Tehran.

 

According to an agreement in the communiqué of 2 August 1945 of the Berlin conference, the sixth section under the title «City of Königsberg and the surrounding area» stated the following: «The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier»127.

The Conference agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet government to transfer the city of Königsberg and surrounding area to the Soviet Union, as described above. However, the exact boundary was the subject of expert’s study. The US President and the British Prime Minister have declared that they «will support this proposal at the forthcoming Peace Conference»128.

Therefore, the Potsdam Conference recognized the need to detach the East Prussia from Germany and incorporate it in Poland and the Soviet Union. The so-called «expert’s study» was not followed due to certain changes in the foreign policy that led to the beginning of the «Cold War».

Owing to the agreements reached at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the northern part of East Prussia, which is about one-third of its total area, was incorporated into the Soviet Union. On 7 April 1946, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the decree «On the establishment on the territory of Königsberg and surrounding area the Königsberg Oblast and inclusion of it in the RSFSR». On 4 July 1946, the area was renamed Kaliningrad Oblast and the town was renamed Kaliningrad.

The main Soviet newspaper «Pravda» wrote about it: «Forever was hoisted the flag of the Soviet Union there, where began their plundering raids to Russia a Teutonic knights, hordes of Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler’s armoured gangs; nowadays Königsberg and surrounding areas have unforgettable name of the great son of Russian nation, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin»129.

2.2. Migration as a source of demographic shift before the collapse of the USSR: Formation of regional society

2.2.1. After the end of hostilities: Deportation of German population

Small or large territories were transferred from one state to another at various points in history. However, the Kaliningrad region is unique in a sense that in a very short period (several years) the population changed completely on a certain territory with defined borders. The population as a medium of historical memory and cultural heritage is gone and other people who had no idea about the new place of residence have replaced it.

The Kaliningrad region is characterized by a «migration genesis» of the population. This feature is confirmed by the fact that more than a half of the region’s inhabitants are not indigenous. They were born out of the territory of the Kaliningrad region. This feature is relevant even to the present time.

Even now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, about a half of residents of the area were not born in the Kaliningrad region, of which only about 20% arrived more than 50 years ago and spent here most of their life130. At present, a significant proportion of non-indigenous population is represented due not only to contemporary migration flows, but also to historical reasons. The Kaliningrad region became part of the Soviet Union after World War II: In the early years, there took place a mass migration of people from other regions of Russia and the republics of the USSR.

It would be emphasized that detailed knowledge about the past is valued not only for its accuracy, but for its ability to influence and estimate present affairs and situation. So how has been Kaliningrad society established?

Migration flows and challenges are among decisive parameters of the life of society and human. Migration is covering the knowledge of the physical and social landscape where people live. They are trying to identify themselves with the place where life take place, and identify with other people with whom migrants interact.

An individual sense of security has high importance for first migrants to the Kaliningrad region. This sense reflected in state’s power to protect people’s interests and ensure their expectations. Interaction between the new place and the state – primarily, with central authorities in Moscow – plays a significant role for the politics of identity in Kaliningrad and has a historical roots to the beginning of the Soviet period of the region’s history.

After the end of hostilities, the humanitarian situation in Königsberg and surrounding area was no less challenging than in last months of the war.

In the aftermath of the hostilities, the industry of East Prussia was almost completely disrupted. According to accounting records of military commandant offices during April —May 1945, 40 per cent enterprises and factories were destroyed131. Lack of appropriate staff not allowed the enterprises to start the recovery of factories immediately. By the decision of the Hague Conference, the countries were not allowed to practice massive migration of citizens to the occupied territory. The USSR got that right only in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference. For this reason, the initial source of the labour forces included demobilized soldiers and officers, repatriates, and local German population.

Conditions of everyday life were very difficult. The housing problem was paramount. The act of a survey, conducted in early 1946, witnessed about enormous difficulties to solve this problem: «Before the war, there were six million square metres of residential space in Königsberg. As on 15 May 1946, the city was spread over an area of 650,000 square metres. However, overhaul of 50% of them is required»132. That is, about only 5% of pre-war accommodation was more or less suitable for housing.

In the city of Königsberg and surrounding area left about 139,000 German citizens after the war133. It should be noted that these figures might not be accurate, because to take into account all inhabitants was impossible. However, on the basis of these figures I can say that in compare to the pre-war period the number of German residents reduced by almost eight times134.

In legal terms the local population was seen as hostile, because formally enacted the occupation regime. Therefore, initially the local population was under curfew, and communication of Soviet military and civilians with them was forbidden.

However, soon things began to change rapidly. In the autumn of 1945 many of the restrictions formally or de-facto ceased to exist. German citizens were allowed freely communicate and change place of residence. Many of them worked at military facilities and bases. Germans filled some local administrations.

In the early post-war months before the mass migration of Soviet citizens, local residents were the main labour force only. Therefore, on 15 February of 1946, the Military District’s Council adopted a resolution that granted local Soviet and German population the right to occupy working positions in industry and agriculture. By the summer of 1946, only in Konigsberg 19,000 German workers were registered135, according to the records of the Office of Civil Affairs136. At that time, more than 25,000 German citizens were employed137. German and Soviet citizens «often lived under the same roof, received the same wages, and worked together on cleaning up the city streets»138.

Gradually, the policy of isolation of the local population was reduced, and they were included in the field of ideological propaganda. The Soviet administration has attempted to cover the German population with typical methods of Soviet propaganda. In February of 1946, «the Central German club» and its district offices were opened in Königsberg. German clubs were the centres of political and cultural life of local population. Information sources in German language were established – radio and the newspaper «New Time»139.

The newspaper «New Time» had been in publication since 1947. Journalist Maria Kubareva who worked with the newspaper remembers: «The German newspaper was established by the decision of the central committee of the party, and was governed by the regional committee of the party. On the front page of the newspaper was written, «New Age. The newspaper for the German population of the Kaliningrad region. Published twice a week». In general, «Neue Zeit» was so typical as most of newspapers of the time. Each copy of newspaper contained a topical article, a selection of news about work on factories, agriculture, and housing reconstruction. It also contained interviews with Germans about working conditions and wages140.

In 1947 – 48, German schools were opened in all districts of the Kaliningrad region. However, the regular learning process began only in 1948, when German schools have become an integral part of the public education system. At this time, the resettlement of German population began, which was why the German schools were closed soon.

Two resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding the resettlement of the local population were taken on 11 October 1947 and 15 February 1948. It was entitled «On the resettlement of Germans from the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR to the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany». First, two groups of people were resettled – inhabitants of coastal areas and the disabled. Each family had the right to take up to 300 kilograms of belongings and a 15-day food ration for the move.

Transportation to Germany took place in several phases. Primarily, echelons of trains were formed. Each echelon contained of 55 cars, each of which housed 40 people. Consequently, by the end of 1948, about 102,000 people were deported to Germany141.

According to the memoirs, many people did not want to leave, but Germans had no opportunity to obtain Soviet citizenship. Among thousands of respondents who were interviewed in Kaliningrad by historians, only an insignificant part considers deportation of Germans as a right decision142.

2.2.2. The settlement: First Kaliningradians

By the time of the establishment in April 1946, the Oblast was inhabited by 35,000 Soviet citizens, and by 1 August 1946, it had 84,500. Some of them were Soviet repatriates who have returned from the concentration camps and «Ostarbeiters». Another category of new residents is demobilized soldiers.

Systematic colonization of new Soviet Oblast launched only after the entry into force of decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 9 July 1946. The document announced the beginning of voluntary resettlement of Soviet citizens in the autumn of 1946. The first social contingent of migrants was collective farmer’s families (kolchosniki) from various regions of the Soviet Russia and Belarus.

The description that characterized the heterogeneity of this category of migrants is important. In regional political department, it was noted that to villages of the Kaliningrad region «under the guise of collective farmers migrates all who wants, except of farmers: there are lawyers, doctors, musicians, technologists, and teachers»143.

Here is the description of one of these typical cases: «T. A. before her resettlement to Kaliningrad worked as a seamstress at „kolkhoz“ „Zarya“ in Turov district of Gomel region; in the emigrant ticket for resettlement she attributed herself with imaginary distant relatives. At the expense of cash benefits she bought a sewing machine to work at home instead of work at „kolkhoz“, when she was not allowed to do it and was asked to proceed to the collective-farm work, she voluntarily left the kolkhoz»144.

Of course, a strong incentive was needed, especially material, for a decision on the voluntary resettlement to Kaliningrad. The settlers were granted with free travel and luggage transportation to the destination, tax exemptions for three years, a lump sum benefit equal to a thousand roubles for the head of the family, and 300 roubles for each family member. Especially for the residents of rural area the important reason was a house and plot of land in a half of hectare, and preferential loans for the purchase of agricultural implements and livestock. A family should consist of two able-bodied members to get the full amount of benefits. As a result, nearly two-thirds of the immigrants were under thirty years old145. People of working age have presented significantly higher proportion of the population in the Kaliningrad region in compare to the national average.

Settling in the Kaliningrad region occurred in two ways – voluntary and by force. Incentive measures and compulsion were applied to the same group of immigrants at the same time. For example, soldiers who fought in East Prussia were offered to stay here after the war and bring their families. Significant hopes were pinned on the institute of political officers («politryki») of military units to solve this task. Here is one of the typical memories of participants of storming out of Königsberg, who were recruited to stay in Oblast: «Political department of our regiment invited demobilized communists, and explained to them: «Dear friends, you fought here, now it is necessary to reconstruct this new land». I told them: «We Communists are people too! I have not been at home for a long time. I am from Saratov region. Why do I need this East Prussia?» In addition, they said, «Communists must be the first»146.

It is important to note the fact that among the first settlers were the majority of those who lost their property and shelter during the war. This is because migration came from areas that were vastly devastated during the war. These people were fully familiar with the hardships of war; they easier agreed to immigrate, as they often nothing to have at the previous place of residence. Many of them have fled of hunger with hope on a better life at new place147.

110Sovetsko-anglijskie otnoshenija vo vremia Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Moscow 1983. Vol. 1, p. 182.
111USSR i Germanskij vopros. 1941—1949. Мoscow 1996. Vol.1, p. 138.
112The «Curzon Line» was recommended in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland. The project of boundary was named in honour of Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, who took into account the ethnic composition of population along boundary line. As a result of the offensive of the Red Army in August 1939 the state border of the USSR with Poland was set roughly along the Curzon line.
113Rzheshevskij, Oleg: Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941. In: Novaja i noveishaja istorija, №2, 1994, p. 91.
114Churchill, Winston: Vtoraja mirovaja vojna. Moscow 1991. Vol. 6, p. 325.
115Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Мoscow 1978. Vol. 1, p. 181.
116Ibid, p. 183.
117Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945.Teheranskaja konferencija. Мoscow 1984. Vol. 2, p. 148—149.
118Ibid, p. 149.
119Ibid, p. 150.
120Ibid.
121Perepiska predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov USSR s prezidentami USA i premier-ministrami Welikobritanii vo vremia Velkoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Moscow 1976, Vol. 1, p. 230.
122Ibid, p. 235.
123Ibid, p. 242—243.
124Feis, Herbert: Churchill. Roosevelt. Stalin. The war they waged and the peace they sought. Princeton 1957, p. 455.
125Ibid, p. 525.
126Teheran – Yalta – Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov. Мoscow 1970, p. 161—162.
127Potsdamer Konferenz, http://potsdamer-konferenz.de/dokumente/protokoll_en.php#VI, accessed on 23.02.2014.
128Berlinskaja (Potsdamskaja) konferencija rukovoditelej trech sojuznych derzhav – USSR, USA i Welikobritanii 17 ijulia – 2 avgusta 1945. Moscow 1980, p. 491—492.
129Pravda, 30 November 1946.
130Kaliningrad: len’ vo spasenije? Kaliningradskaja Pravda, 12 Mai 2005.
131Kolganova, Energija: Obrazovanie i razvitie Kaliningradskoj oblasti – nacionalnyj podvig sovjetskogo naroda. Kaliningrad 1974, p. 43.
132GAKO. The state archive of the Kaliningrad region. Box 298, folder 4, file 2, sheet 1.
133Isupov, Vladimir; Kretinin, Gennady (ed.): Vostochnaja Prussija s drevnejshih vremen do konza vtoroj mirovoj voyny. Kaliningrad 1996, p. 494—495 (on 1st of September 1945 the Special Military District of Königsberg was populated by 139614 persons).
134According to the census of 1939 on the same territory lived 1089000 persons.
135Isupov, Vasilij (ed.): Vostochnaja Prussija. S drevneishich vremen do konza vtoroj mirovoj voiny. Istoricheskie ocherki. Dokumenty. Materialy. Kaliningrad 1996, p. 493.
136Temporary Office of Civil Affairs existed in the period from July1945 to July 1947 until the first election of permanent executive authorities.
137Isupov, Vladimir; Kretinin, Gennady (ed.): Vostochnaja Prussija s drevnejshih vremen do konza vtoroj mirovoj voyny. Kaliningrad 1996, p. 493.
138Hoppe, Bert: Auf den Trümmern von Königsberg. Kaliningrad 1946—1970. München 2000, p. 34.
139Stroganova, Natalja: «Neue Zeit» – gazeta dla nemezkogo naselenija Kaliningradskoj oblasti. In: Vestnik Baltijskogo federalnogo universiteta imeni I. Kanta, 6/2006, p. 52—56.
140Kostjashov, Juri: Op. cit., 2002, p. 144.
141Kretinin, Gennady: Ocherkii storii Vostochnoj Prussii. Kaliningrad 2004, p. 463.
142Obrussenie Prussii; http://www.vremya.ru/2010/2/13/245113.html, accessed 12. 04. 2013.
143GAKO. The state archive of the Kaliningrad region. Box 121, folder 1, file 7, sheet 51—51.
144GAKO. The state archive of the Kaliningrad region. Box 183, folder 5, file 154, sheet 51
145GAKO. The state archive of the Kaliningrad region. Box 330. folder 1. file 18., sheet 2.
146Kostjashov, Juri: Vostochnaja Prussia glazami sovjetskih pereselencev. Pervye gody Kaliningradskoj oblasti v vospominanijah i dokumentah, St. Petersburg 2002, p. 69.
147Kostjashov, Juri: Zaselenie Kaliningradskoj oblasti posle vtoroi mirovoj vojny, In: Humanitarnaja nauka v Rossii, Moscow 1996. Vol. 2, p. 87.